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Semiconductor memory is an example of a good undergoing continuing, rapid 
technological change, with historical price declines even more dramatic than 
in the (now well-documented) case of computers.  Indeed, declines in the cost 
of memory are most likely a major cause underlying the striking behavior of 
computer prices. 
A twenty-year downward spiral in memory prices came to an abrupt halt in 
1987. For the first time in the recorded history of the chip industry, substantial 
and sustained increases in memory costs were noted in  1987 and  1988. Al- 
though the reason for these increases is not the focus of this paper, it is reason- 
able to suspect that the negotiation of the Semiconductor Trade Arrangement 
(STA) between the United States and Japan, which became operational in late 
1986, may have catalyzed this abrupt reversal of historical trends (see Flamm 
1989, 1990, 1993). 
This paper was motivated by  my  difficulties in determining exactly what 
happened to memory prices in 1987 and 1988 and what the probable effect of 
these price increases was on computer systems prices. It is concerned primar- 
ily with the task of  analyzing price indexes for the computer memory chip 
type that accounts for the vast bulk of the market, the so-called dynamic ran- 
dom access memory (DRAM). Existing data on DRAM prices suffer from 
many deficiencies, most of  which are detailed below  (although not  all are 
remedied). Producer price indexes prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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(BLS) suffer from critical problems described below and in Dulberger (chap. 
3  in this  volume). By default, estimates prepared  by the market consulting 
firm Dataquest are the most commonly used source of price data in this indus- 
try  (they are used by Dulberger and even published in the official Statistical 
Abstract of  the United States). 
For this reason, I examine the methodology underlying the Dataquest price 
estimates in some detail in this paper. Rather than rely on the Dataquest fig- 
ures, this paper develops new time-series data on DRAM prices from data on 
individual transactions and presents an econometric analysis of pricing prac- 
tices within the market that enables us to control for relevant characteristics of 
the product  and the transaction.  Approximate  Fisher Ideal DRAM price in- 
dexes using this new data are also constructed; these research  price indexes 
may be of use in future work on this important industry. 
I begin with a discussion of the nature of the product, its technology, and 
the industrial organization of the DRAM market. Then follows an examina- 
tion of existing data on DRAM pricing and the strengths and weaknesses of 
different statistical sources. This is followed by an econometric analysis of a 
sample of  actual DRAM contracts, from which both a price index and some 
suggestive analysis are then extracted. 
5.1  The Product and Its Technology 
Memory chips are the largest  single segment in the  U.S. semiconductor 
market, accounting for 28  percent of  sales in  1989; they  accounted  for 34 
percent of integrated circuit (IC) consumption.2 The dominant product (with 
almost  two-thirds of  memory  sales) was  the DRAM, which  by  itself  ac- 
counted for 20 percent of American IC consumption in 1989. 
The first widely used commercial DRAM was the  1K memory (K means 
1,024 bits of  information), introduced  in  1970 by American  semiconductor 
companies. A new generation  chip (with four times the capacity of the last 
generation) has been  introduced  approximately  every  three  years  since the 
mid- 1970s. 
At  center stage in  the continuing saga of  technological  improvement  in 
DRAMs sits continuing advance in semiconductor manufacturing processes. 
Improvements in  fabrication  technology  have  steadily  reduced  the  size of 
electronic circuit elements and stimulated  development  of  fabrication  pro- 
cesses for novel  types  of  physical  microstructures  implementing  standard 
electronic functions. 
The principal  and overwhelmingly important characteristic  of  a  DRAM 
from the point of view of its consumers is its bit capacity, the amount of infor- 
2. These figures are based on U.S.  market estimates from Electronics, January 1990, 83. Note 
that  only  a  small  fraction  of  DRAMs consumed  are  manufactured  within  the  United States; 
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mation it can hold. The effect of technical improvement is typically measured 
in cost per bit. Greater density would be more desirable even in the absence 
of reduction in bit cost, however, because fewer chips must be interconnected 
within a system, lowering system manufacturing costs. 
Faster access speed is also of importance to users but, like manufacturing 
cost per bit, is highly correlated with circuit density over the long run. Higher 
density parts are generally considerably faster than older parts; the shorter 
lengths of connections between circuit elements improve speed. 
DRAMs are generally designed with some “standard,” average speed spec- 
ification  in mind.  Typically, the result  of  the fabrication  process  is a bell- 
shaped distribution around the specified speed, at which the chips perform 
adequately. The chips residing in the left tail of the distribution are identified 
through testing; those not meeting the design specifications have their speed 
ratings reduced and are sold at a discount. 
As  fabrication  technology  continuously  improves,  chip size  is  shrunk. 
Three or more such “die shrinks” may typically occur over the life cycle of a 
given capacity DRAM within  a single company. A desirable  side effect of 
incrementally smaller chips is gradually improved speed. Thus, the speed of 
the “standard” 256K DRAM produced by most manufacturers went from 150 
to 120 nanosecond (ns) access time over the period 1987-88,  the result of die 
shrinks. Even improvements in manufacturing processes for an existing de- 
sign have often been associated with changes in product specifications large 
enough to lead to reclassification as new product types. 
Chips also use power, and lower power consumption is desirable. It means 
less costly power supplies, and costs for heat dissipation, within systems that 
use chips. Beginning with the 64K generation, a lower-power chip technology 
known as CMOS (complementary metal-oxide semiconductor) gradually be- 
gan to displace an older technology (known as NMOS [n-channel metal-oxide 
semiconductor])  in  DRAM manufacture.  The  introduction  of  the  1M (for 
megabit,  1,024K) DRAM  marked  the  almost  complete  displacement  of 
NMOS by CMOS technology in DRAM manufacture, so power consumption 
is rarely an important factor in selection among current generation chips. 
Because  improvements  in  virtually  all  the  desirable  characteristics  of 
DRAMs have been positively correlated with lower bit cost, cost per bit can 
probably be regarded as an upper bound on a suitably defined index of quality- 
adjusted chip cost. Data presented later in this paper show that, over at least 
some time periods, changes in simple cost per bit, for chips of given memory 
capacity, have not diverged greatly from a superlative DRAM price index ac- 
counting for technical improvements in speed and organization as well. 
A crucial point to make is that virtually all technological improvement in 
DRAMs has been embodied in the introduction  of distinct and identifiable 
new products, as opposed to more subtle qualitative improvement in existing 
chips. Because of this, construction of a price index that properly identifies 
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rectly capture the effect of technological advance (and other factors) on the 
cost of that input. 
5.1.1  Product Differentiation 
DRAMS-and  other memory chips-have  a reputation as the “commod- 
ity”  product  par  excellence  within  the  semiconductor  industry:  a  high- 
volume, standardized good, with almost perfect substitution among different 
manufacturers’ offerings the norm. Chips from different manufacturers use the 
same array of package types, pins, and have many common minimal technical 
specifications. They mainly use the same speed classifications (rated in nano- 
seconds average access time to a bit). Products with appropriate specifications 
from different manufacturers may be substituted within a given piece of equip- 
ment. Although DRAMs are in this sense a “commodity” product, the actual 
physical design of the chip’s internal structures and many subtle aspects of its 
performance vary by manufacturer. 
Because of subtle but important variation across producers in DRAM elec- 
trical and physical performance parameters, large manufacturers typically put 
a device through an extensive and expensive qualification pro~ess.~  Some re- 
testing is required every time the manufacturing process for a chip is changed. 
These costs provide an important economic incentive for systems manufactur- 
ers  to  limit the  number of  qualified  suppliers for a particular  application. 
Quality standards maintained by a manufacturer reduce the need to test com- 
ponents after purchase, and DRAMs are generally shipped to large customers 
in boxes with quality seals to guarantee factory-set standards (physical han- 
dling of  chips is a major cause of failure or degradation). Purchasing chips 
from a new supplier, or outside manufacturer-controlled sales  channel^,^ will 
generally lead to expensive additional testing. 
Until recent years, DRAM manufacturers did not differentiate their prod- 
ucts  much in any dimensions other than  speed and quality/reliability. This 
began to change in a significant way with the 64K generation of DRAMs, first 
shipped  in  1979  (see  Flaherty  and  Huang  1988,  12).  The  organization 
of chips (the way in which  memory is accessed) began to diversify: a  1M 
DRAM, for example, may now be purchased in 1M  X  1 or 256K  X  4 con- 
figurations. New, specialized addressing structures were increasingly ~ffered.~ 
And  specialized,  proprietary  DRAM designs with  application-specific  fea- 
tures became increasingly common: line buffers for television and video use, 
3. Merely qualifying and testing a second source for a part already in use was estimated by one 
industry source to cost $120,000.  Qualification costs were large enough to prompt at  least one 
group of relatively large computer manufacturers to form a cooperative chip qualification joint 
venture, in order to pool these costs. Within the electronics purchasing community, talk of the 
economic pressure to reduce the number of suppliers is a staple of everyday conversation. 
4.  Unless, as sometimes happens, the chips can be purchased in boxes with the original factory 
quality seals intact. 
5.  Manufacturers of DRAMs now typically offer products with “page,” “fast page,” “nibble,” 
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multiple-ported buffers for computer graphics applications, bidirectional data 
buffers. Finally, a bewildering alphabet soup of package types is now used to 
encase a finished DRAM. There are many types of single-chip plastic casing 
for DRAMs,~  ceramic cases, and various kinds of multichip memory module 
packages. 
Organization, addressing structures, and application-specific designs mark 
off substantially different products. Although they may be created on the same 
production line, different tooling, fabrication steps, and manufacturing prob- 
lems characterize these products. Packaging, on the other hand, can probably 
be regarded as a nonessential difference among chips. At a relatively late stage 
in the fabrication process, decisions can be made to change the mix of pack- 
ages used for the product. Indeed, competition among manufacturers works 
to drive costs for a DRAM toward the market price for that DRAM in  the 
standard plastic case, plus some incremental add-on reflecting the cost to the 
producer  of  additional packaging  options.  If  demand  for a single specific 
package  type  exceeds  supply, pushing price  up,  manufacturers  can  easily 
switch output to that package type quite late in the production process. 
Note that the relative prices of  DRAMs of varying sizes and organizations 
are quite volatile and do not seem to be linked by a particularly stable relation, 
even within the course of a single year. In particular, faster parts are typically 
introduced at a substantial premium relative to lower-speed components; this 
premium rapidly erodes over time, however, as the mix of output shifts toward 
faster chips, for reasons discussed next. Figure 5.1 shows the retail prices of 
various DRAMs relative to a garden variety 265K  x  1, 120 ns part, as re- 
ported in advertisements by one Los Angeles-area  mail-order vendor over the 
course of a year.’ Relative prices fluctuated quite a lot (note the rapid erosion 
in fast 60 ns 256K  X  1 and 80 ns 64K  X  4 chip prices relative to more ma- 
ture products). 
5.2  Industrial Organization of the DRAM Market 
Different classes of consumers purchase DRAMs through different sets of 
marketing channels. The distinctions are important: over the last half decade, 
price  movements  in  each  of  these  distinct  market  segments  have  varied 
greatly. Government policies seem to have accentuated these differences and 
created  sharp regional  (i.e., the United  States, Europe,  Japan,  Asia,  etc.) 
price  differentials  in what seems to have been a previously  well-integrated 
6. The most common was the familiar dual in-line pin (DIP), but there is also the single in-line 
pin package (SIPP), the zig-zag-in-line pin (ZIP), the small outline J-leaded (SOJ) case, and the 
plastic-leaded chip carrier (PLCC). 
7. The vendor is L.A. Trade, and the source for these prices is the publication Computer Shop- 
per.  Scrutiny of  dated advertisements  elsewhere in this publication  suggests a two-month lag 
between submission of advertising copy and the month of publication for the magazine. The prices 
shown here are assigned to their inferred submission dates. 162  Kenneth Flamm 
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Fig. 5.1  Relative DRAM prices 
market. Finally, user-supplier relations appear to play an important but poorly 
understood role in determining market prices for DRAMS. 
5.2.1  Market Organization 
There are three basic purchasing channels linking the supplier with users of 
ICs. First, large electronic equipment manufacturers (so-called OEMs, origi- 
nal  equipment manufacturers) who purchase large volumes of  product deal 
directly with  chip manufacturers. Transactions in  this market are generally 
labeled contruct pricing.  It is not unknown for OEMs to contract for large 
purchase volumes in order to qualify for volume pricing discounts, then resell 
the surplus over their actual needs to brokers. 
Second, chip manufacturers maintain a formal distribution network through 
“authorized distributors” to service lower-volume customers. Chip manufac- 
turers warrant the product distributed through this channel and often play an 
important role in the technical support and quality assurance programs offered 
to the customers. Given the historical fact of a continuous yet relatively vola- 
tile decline in chip prices, manufacturers have historically offered their autho- 
rized U.S. distributors “price protection,” the assurance that distributors low- 
ering  their  sales  prices  to  meet  market  competition will  receive  a  credit 
reflecting the difference between the distributor’s purchase price and the lower 
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assumed by  the chip manufacturer. Pricing generally seems to be on a spot 
basis, although there can be a substantial lead time between orders and deliv- 
eries in times of buoyant demand, and distributor prices take on a “contract” 
aspect. 
Finally, there is the so-called grey, or spot, market. Independent distribu- 
tors, brokers, and speculators buy and sell lots of  chips for immediate deliv- 
ery. There is also a significant retail market selling directly to computer resell- 
ers and users wishing to upgrade computer systems or replace defective parts. 
Supplies of chips on the American grey market come from chip manufactur- 
ers, OEMs,  and authorized distributors selling their excess inventories and 
also from Japanese trading companies and wholesalers purchasing directly 
from Japanese DRAM manufacturers (see, e.g., USITC 1986, A-12). Grey 
market product is not warranted by the manufacturer and has frequently been 
subjected to unknown handling and quality assurance procedures. 
In  1985, U.S.  industry sources estimated that authorized distributors ac- 
counted for about 30 percent of  chip manufacturers’ DRAM sales (USITC 
1985, A10-A1  1). Since grey market sales are often resales of product origi- 
nally sold through OEM contracts or authorized distributors and double count 
chips flowing into the grey channel from sources other than chip manufactur- 
ers, one must be careful in calculating the share of  these different channels 
in sales to final users. One  1985 estimate held that 20 percent of  “the mar- 
ket” (presumably, end users) is accounted for by the grey channel in times of 
shortage. 
This is roughly in sync with more recent estimates. In early 1989, one in- 
dustry source estimated that perhaps 70 percent of  DRAM sales were “con- 
tract” sales made directly by producers to large users, 15 percent went to final 
users  through  authorized  distributors,  and  an  additional  15 percent  went 
through the grey market.8 
5.2.2  Government Policy and Regional Segmentation of the Market 
A final factor complicating discussion of DRAM prices was the appearance 
of  significant regional price differentials in  1987 and  1988, after the signing 
of the STA. In response to the STA, the U.S. and Japanese governments began 
to set floor prices for export sales of DRAMS  by Japanese companies. Initially, 
different standards were set for sales to the U.S. market and other (“third- 
country”) export markets; after U. s. protests, the systems were later unified. 
(In response to European protests, the pricing guidelines were separated again 
in 1989.) 
Regulation of  Japanese export  sales ultimately  involved  four elements. 
First, an export licensing system was adopted. This system required de facto 
government approval of the export price, which was to be set above minimum 
8.  The estimate is that of Don Bell, of Bell Microproducts Inc., whom I thank for spending the 
morning of 16 February 1989 attempting to educate me in the intricacies of the DRAM market. 164  Kenneth Flamm 
norms established  by  Japan’s Ministry of  International  Trade and Industry 
(MITI). Second, foreign purchasers of Japanese chips were required to regis- 
ter with MITI. Third, all export transactions required a certificate provided by 
the original chip manufacturer attesting to the fact that the chips in question 
were actually manufactured by that producer. Fourth, MITI established infor- 
mal regional allocation guidelines to ensure that supplies were not diverted 
from one export market to favor another. 
By most accounts, MITI’s guidance was quite effective in setting minimum 
pricing  standards for Japanese DRAM manufacturers’  direct export  sales. 
(Because Japanese manufacturers were by  this time responsible for between 
80 and 90 percent of world DRAM sales, this effectively worked as a floor on 
price in the global market.) The intent of the second and third elements was 
clearly to reduce access by foreign purchasers to Japanese grey market chan- 
nels not under the direct supervision and control of  Japanese chip manufactur- 
ers. Predictably, prices in the unregulated Japanese market soon dropped be- 
low foreign export prices. In 1988, articles in the Japanese business press (see 
the references to them in Flamm [  19931) suggested that the differential be- 
tween domestic and export pricing was quite large. 
5.3  Historical Data on DRAM Prices: A Review and Comparison 
At a relatively aggregate level of detail, BLS publishes matched-model pro- 
ducer price indexes for integrated circuits, including an estimated index for 
MOS memory. It is obvious to all those familiar with pricing behavior in the 
industry, however, that the BLS price indexes grossly underestimate price de- 
clines in entire classes of semiconductor products subject to rapid technologi- 
cal change, such as memory chips.  (For example, the BLS producer price 
index for MOS memory ICs declines by about 50 percent over the five-year 
period from June 1981 to June 1986, implying an annual rate of price decline 
of only 13 percent .) 
The most significant reason for this bias is probably the infrequent updating 
of the sample of products covered and recalibration of their relative weights. 
(Also, in recent years,  fierce competition had led many U.S.  producers  to 
withdraw from producing certain of the products with the steepest price de- 
clines, so the slow decline of the BLS IC price indexes may also reflect in part 
a shift in the product  mix of  U.S.  producers  toward chips undergoing  less 
rapid price declines.) Figure 5.2 sketches out a stylized view of the typical 
price trajectory over time for a new generation of memory chip-very  steep 
initial declines, followed by much less rapid decline. Assume, for simplicity, 
that the mix of shipments quickly shifts to the new generation of chip when 
its cost per bit declines below that of the older generation chip, at time T,,  but 
that very small quantities of  the older generation chip are shipped for long 
periods afterward. An approximation to an exact price index would then look 
something like line ABC and would catch most of the rapid fall in the initial 165  Measurement of DRAM Prices: Technology and Market Structure 
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stages  of  the  new  generation  part’s  life  cycle.  Delaying  updating  of  the 
sample, and adjusting weights for a price index, until time T2,  as is probably 
the empirical case, would result in the index traced out by line ABD, which 
substantially underestimates the true decline. 
Until the mid-l980s, there is essentially only one published  source of his- 
torical price data on DRAMS: Dataquest,  an American market research firm. 
Dataquest publishes quarterly estimates of DRAM production,  by bit capac- 
ity, and an aggregate worldwide “average selling price”  (ASP) for every ca- 
pacity chip then in large-scale production.  ASP is a “billing” price; that is, it 
reflects bills sent out when product is actually shipped. Because there is often 
a lag between when a sale is negotiated (“booked”) and when product actually 
ships under the agreed terms, current “billing” price was the “booking” price 
in an earlier period when the purchase was negotiated. There are several indi- 
cations that the Dataquest ASP estimates have become less reliable in the pe- 
riod after 1985.9 
Since 1985, Dataquest ASP estimates have been supplemented by quarterly 
contract booking price data based on a survey conducted elsewhere within the 
Dataquest organization. While the methodology used to construct both sets of 
numbers  has  apparently  never  been  formalized,  or  published,I0 interviews 
9. Further  analysis of  price data supporting  this statement is available on request from the 
author. 
10. The published methodology for quarterly contract booking prices consists of  the following: 
“Dataquest collects price information on a quarterly basis from North American suppliers and 
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with  various Dataquest  staff members in  1989-90  provided  some basic idea 
of the general procedures used at that time to construct these two series. 
Prior to  1985, the Dataquest  ASPS were apparently based exclusively on 
“informal inquiries” and “ongoing dialogue” on pricing trends with both pro- 
ducers and users of semiconductors. After  1985, when Dataquest began its 
quarterly  survey of U. S. booking prices  for semiconductor purchasing con- 
tracts, these quarterly U.S.  booking prices have been the starting point for a 
more  systematic  estimation  procedure  for  average  selling  (billing)  prices 
worldwide.  In essence, the estimation  procedure  applies considerable judg- 
mental input to survey data on U.S. booking (or order) price for a few standard 
parts, in order to derive a very much more detailed worldwide billing (or ship- 
ping) price matrix for a much larger number of products,  which is then used 
to produce estimates of aggregate revenues, in turn the basis for the ASP esti- 
mates.” If the numbers fail consistency checks, or if customer feedback sug- 
gests that the numbers are inaccurate,  or if  significant doubts are otherwise 
raised, either the original booking price estimate based on survey data or the 
various pricing structure assumptions used to construct the ASPs, or both, is 
adjusted  until  “reconciliation”  is accomplished.  Thus, published  Dataquest 
ASPS are a complex hybrid of limited survey data, analyst judgments, and 
informal dialogue with Dataquest’s customers. 
The feedback from manufacturers and users may very well serve to improve 
these estimates of average quarterly billing prices. Comparable numbers are 
readily available within most chip producers’ sales and chip consumers’ pur- 
chasing departments. For this reason, the aggregate billing price estimates are 
probably more accurate than the quarterly booking price data, despite the fact 
that the latter, not the former, are what is actually measured in Dataquest sur- 
veys. 
The quarterly  price  survey (of U.S.  booking prices),  apparently the only 
semiformal survey instrument used by Dataquest analysts in constructing their 
worldwide ASPs, is sent to approximately eighty to ninety U.S.-based  com- 
panies, of which approximately 60 percent are manufacturers and 40 percent 
users. It covered  140 different types of parts in  1989 (of which a very small 
[Semiconductor User Information Service] analysts for consistency and reconciliation. The infor- 
mation finally is rationalized with worldwide billings price data in association with product ana- 
lysts, resulting in the current forecast” (I thank Mark Giudice, of Dataquest,  for providing me 
with this on 11 July 1990). 
11. Conversation with Fred Jones,  Dataquest Semiconductor Industry Service, 20 July 1990. 
The bookings price reported by the quarterly survey is “adjusted” to an equivalent billings price 
on the basis of  an analyst’s estimate of  the lag between bookings  and billings,  the effects of 
ongoing renegotiation of current (and write-downs of backlogged) orders under older contracts, 
and sales to the spot market. Estimates of  product mix price differentials are then applied to a 
“base” billing price to get a price structure for a much larger number of products (other speeds, 
other organizations, other packaging) than is covered by  the survey. Still more analyst estimates 
and judgments of regional price differentials are combined with detailed estimates of quantities 
shipped by region, then aggregated over regions, to arrive at a worldwide estimate of revenues 
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number were DRAMS).’*  Respondents are asked to provide estimates of their 
average booking price, for given products and volumes. The quarterly book- 
ing price estimate is then constructed as a weighted  average of  these re- 
sponses, with weights based on annual aggregate semiconductor production 
by responding producers and the estimated annual aggregate semiconductor 
procurement of surveyed consumers. Conceptually, therefore, it is neither an 
input, nor an output,  nor a consumer price index. The survey covers only 
U.S .-based suppliers and purchasers. 
Apparently in response to the creation of  the “monitoring” system asso- 
ciated with the STA in 1986, price floors, and significant regional price differ- 
entials, Dataquest began a new program reporting regional contract pricing 
for a sample of twenty-five semiconductor components, on a biweekly basis. 
These data (the “Dataquest Monday Report”) are based on a survey of six to 
ten respondents, primarily chip manufacturers, in each of six geographic re- 
gions.I3 For DRAMs, the survey asks for the current contract price negotiated 
in three different volumes: 1,000,  10,000, and volume (over  100,000).14  If 
producers have not concluded any contracts for a particular volume, they are 
asked to estimate the price that would have been negotiated on a contract of 
that size. Japanese producers do not report a contract price, and Japanese price 
data refer to “large volume wholesale” prices. 
The data discussed thus far have largely ignored DRAMs sold by distribu- 
tors and in the spot market. This misses an important dimension of the change 
in market conditions after the signing of the STA. To  remedy this situation, I 
have constructed time series showing retail spot prices for memory chips, be- 
ginning in the spring of  1985. To do so, I collected weekly data on sales prices 
by  one of  the largest retail vendors of  memory chips in the United States.15 
The advertised prices are dated (an important point since there is typically a 
substantial lag between the submission of  advertising copy and its publica- 
tion). Contacts with this vendor have also made it clear to me that these are 
real prices; that is, in-stock product is actually available at these prices. The 
contrast with contract prices is striking: spot retail prices for 256K DRAMs 
quadrupled between early 1987 and early 1988, while U.S. contract prices (as 
measured by the Dataquest Monday series) merely increased by 60 percent! 
The conclusion that emerges from a comparison of the bits and pieces of 
information available on DRAM pricing is that, prior to 1985, various avail- 
able price series are roughly consistent and tend to move relatively closely 
together.  Significant  regional  differentials  were  not  important.  All  this 
changed after 1987; it became much more important to disaggregate by  sales 
12. By the spring of 1990, the survey had been expanded to cover 21 1 types of parts. 
13. I thank  Mark  Giudice, of  Dataquest, who,  in  various conversations in  1989 and  1990, 
provided the description of  the Dataquest Monday Report Survey given here. 
14. In some published Dataquest reports, it is stated that “volume” prices mean greater than 
20,000 parts, not 100,ooO; the definition of volume for DRAMs is apparently an exception to this 
rule. 
15. A detailed analysis of  these data may be found in Flamm ( 1993). 168  Kenneth Flamm 
channel  and  region  in tracking  DRAM prices  actually faced by  users.  For 
example, assume that the grey market accounted for 15 percent of consump- 
tion by volume and 25 percent of consumption by value in some base year. If 
grey  market  sales  prices  quadruple (to construct  a  not-so-hypothetical  ex- 
ample) while prices in other sales channels merely double, the increased cost 
to chip consumers will be about 25 percent greater than what is shown by a 
price index based solely on sales through non-grey  market channels! 
5.4  The Economic Role of Contract Pricing 
Given that perhaps 70 percent of  DRAM sales are initially made as direct 
“contract” sales to large users, it is useful to examine the nature of these con- 
tracts in detail. An econometric analysis of contract prices will permit one to 
control for detailed characteristics of DRAMs and DRAM contracts and more 
accurately measure a “quality-adjusted” price for DRAMs. The analysis will 
be applied in constructing Fisher Ideal price indexes in the next section of this 
paper. 
Typically, “contract”  sales  are  commitments  to  supply  some quantity  of 
parts, at some specified  price, beginning  at one future date, and ending at 
another future date. However, they rarely seem to be legally binding commit- 
ments. The prices specified in these long-term contracts generally appear to 
hold when shipments under the contract begin but often do not persist over the 
life of the contract.  Many contracts contain explicit provisions for renegotia- 
tion of price downward,  at the purchaser’s  option, in response to changing 
market conditions; purchasers also successfully demand downward price ad- 
justments even when no such provision is explicitly made.16 
Furthermore, because the system of  price floors for DRAMs put into place 
by the U.S. Commerce Department in 1986 specified that the prevailing floor 
price at the time a legally binding contract was drawn up and signed remained 
in force throughout the life of the contract, despite expected future declines in 
DRAM prices,  there was an additional disincentive to producing  a formal, 
legally binding  document. On the  other hand,  suppliers generally  seem to 
respect contract prices as a de facto ceiling on prices charged their customers 
(although, during the unprecedented increase in memory chip prices of  1987- 
88,  some purchasers  apparently  did face cancellation  or reduction  of  pre- 
scribed contract volumes at the negotiated price). 
If contract prices are generally not legally or practically binding much be- 
yond the original beginning date for the contract, what then is the purpose of 
entering  into one of these  informal, “handshake” commitments?  Interviews 
with OEM purchasing managers suggest that assuring the quantity of DRAMs 
16. An interesting compendium of DRAM contract “horror” stones-users  and producers re- 
pudiating oral and written price commitments in response to changing market conditions-may 
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to be purchased from suppliers is the major objective of these arrangements. 
In fact, purchasers frequently suggest that the critical issue in times of extreme 
shortage is not necessarily pricing but getting adequate supplies. Spot market 
purchases may create other significant costs for the chip consumer that extend 
beyond the purchase price. Additional qualification costs or extensive addi- 
tional testing may be required for purchases from new sources or grey market 
suppliers. 
Producers  of  DRAMs face a different logic. Significant “learning-curve’’ 
effects lead to a sharp increase in the output of any given initial investment in 
DRAM production capacity over the product life cycle of that generation of 
DRAM. Producers must be concerned about volatility in demand for the in- 
creasing quantities of DRAMs that will be flowing off of existing fabrication 
lines in future periods. Quantity commitments lock purchasers into deliveries 
of a given producer’s output and reduce the odds that large volumes of chips 
emerging from ever more productive factories will have to be liquidated in the 
grey market. 
My working hypothesis, then, is that long-term chip contracts represent the 
marriage of quantity commitments to a forward price in force at the beginning 
of  the contract.  Over the remaining life of  the contract, however, contract 
buyers seem to enjoy something like the “price protection” offered to distrib- 
utors. 
5.4.1  Econometric Analysis of Contract Pricing 
I collected confidential data on OEM DRAM contracts covering the period 
1985-89  from industry sources. The data are drawn from contracts negotiated 
by  a small number of  European and North American electronic equipment 
OEMs; the bulk of  the  reported  contracts refer  to purchases  by  European 
users. Characteristics of the contracts that were collected include negotiation 
date, start date for shipments, period over which shipments are to be deliv- 
ered, total quantity commitments over this period, contract price, nationalities 
of chip vendors (American, European, Korean, and Japanese) and purchasers, 
chip organization and packaging, and chip speed (access time). After discard- 
ing contracts for which speed measures were unavailable (or covering parts 
with a mixture of speeds), parts that used packages other than plastic dual in- 
line  pin  (DIP),  plastic-leaded  chip carrier  (PLCC,  in  the  case  of  256K 
DRAMs only) and small outline cases (SO, in the case of 1M DRAMs only),” 
and chips with relatively  uncommon organization,I8 a sample of  83 agree- 
ments for 64K DRAMs,  174 for 256K DRAMs, and  128 for 1M DRAMs 
remained.  A  growing variety  of  chip  organizations  and  packaging  in  this 
17. These involved a small number of observations divided among a relatively large group of 
other packages. Only 256K DRAMs with access times of  120 ns, or faster, were packaged in 
PLCC cases in the contracts in this sample. 
18. Chip organizations other than  64K  X  1, 256K  X  1,  1M  X  1,  or 256K  X  4 (the latter 
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sample, with each new generation of  DRAM, confirms my earlier observa- 
tions about increasing product differentiation in the DRAM market. 
I examined  the distribution  of these contracts by lead time (months from 
negotiation date to start date) and length (duration of contract,  months from 
start date to end date). It was readily apparent that the vast bulk of these con- 
tracts  begin  with  a  very  short period  after  their  negotiation.  The contract 
lengths cluster around three-,  six-, and twelve-months’ duration.  More than 
40 percent of the contracts for 64K and 256K DRAMS and 29 percent of those 
for  1M DRAMs could  be considered  “spot”:  shipments were  scheduled  to 
begin  in  the month  they  were  negotiated.  A  large but  smaller fraction (38 
percent of the  lM, 28 percent of  the 256K,  14 percent of  the 64K) were to 
begin  in the month following the contract’s negotiation.  All remaining con- 
tracts began within two to six months for 64K parts; 2 percent of 256K DRAM 
and 7 percent of  1M DRAM contracts began more than six months later. 
The distributions  for 64K  and 256K  DRAM agreements before and after 
September  1986 suggest  that  contracts  negotiated  after that date tended  to 
have longer lead times and to last longer. A formal chi-square test comparing 
pre-  and  post-STA  distributions  generally  confirmed  these  casual  impres- 
sions.I9 (But note that the period prior to the signing of the STA was one in 
which  markets  saw abundant  supplies and generally declining prices,  while 
1987 and 1988 were generally marked by firm or rising prices and tightening 
supplies.) 
My analysis treats observed prices as being derived from some “base” mar- 
ket price for a standard DRAM in a plastic DIP case, corrected for the incre- 
mental costs of more complex packaging (recall the discussion of  “packaging 
arbitrage” above). Discussions with electronics purchasing personnel suggest 
that this is, indeed, how price is conceptualized when contracts are negotiated 
(i.e., projections of the prevailing prices for the “base” product are added to 
the cost of specialized packaging).  Quantity discounts (presumably reflecting 
fixed selling costs) and vendor nationality effects (which may reflect percep- 
tions of  quality by chip consumers or distinctive sales strategies by groups of 
firms) will also be considered as possible reasons for deviation from prevail- 
ing “base” DRAM prices.  Prices paid by European and American customers 
will also be permitted to differ in the statistical analysis, in order to test for the 
apparently  increasing  regional  segmentation of  DRAM markets after  1986. 
Specification of the determinants of this “base” price is the subject to which I 
next turn. 
5.4.2  An Econometric Model of Forward Pricing in DRAMs 
My  starting  point  is  the  notion  that  these  “contract”  prices  are  forward 
prices, reflecting expectations at the negotiation date for spot DRAM prices at 
19. Rejecting a null hypothesis of  no change at  the 5 percent level, 1 conclude that both lead 
times and lengths of  contracts signed for the newer 256K DRAMs seem to have increased after 
the STA was signed, while lead times increased for more mature 64K chips (but I did not reject 
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the start date for the contract. The 40 percent of contracts that start immedi- 
ately are true “spot”  prices. If these contract prices were truly binding over 
the life of  the contract, then one would  further expect this price to decline 
with contract length, in a regime of falling DRAM prices, since the fixed price 
would have to be adjusted down to leave a purchaser  indifferent  between  a 
longer contract and a sequence of shorter-term forward contracts. (The oppo- 
site, of  course, would occur in a regime of rising DRAM prices.) Length of 
contract has been included as an explanatory variable in order to test the null 
hypothesis that contract length plays no significant role in price determina- 
tion, in accordance with the a priori perception  that initial contract  price is 
generally  renegotiated  as soon as there are significant reductions  in DRAM 
prices. 
My approach is borrowed from the literature on futures prices.*O The basic 
identity is 
wheref:  is forward price at time r for period s, Er[PS]  is the expectation- 
conditional on information available at time r-of  spot price in period s, and 
5:  is defined as bias, the difference between forward price and expected spot 
price. 
If the forward price is “unbiased,” then the 5 term will be zero. On the other 
hand, a risk-averse  speculator requires a positive return to buy forward con- 
tracts and accept the risk associated  with uncertainty  about future prices, so 
the 5 term may be negative. The latter situation was described by  Keynes as 
his  theory  of  “normal backwardation.”  Whether future prices  generally  are 
unbiased, or exhibit normal backwardation, or possibly even a positive bias, 
is the subject of heated debate and will be treated as an empirical question in 
what follows.2’ 
At a minimum, I shall assume that, for any generation of chip, market par- 
ticipants’ expectations about supply and demand fluctuations are generated by 
some “model”  that remains constant over the product life cycle of that chip 
and that a fixed stationary term structure of forward contract prices prevails, 
that is, that the bias term in equation (1) is given by a function of delivery lead 
time, s - r (aside from random, mean zero disturbances).  This means that 
we can rewrite (1) as 
Deviations of forward prices from expected spot price at delivery are given by 
a set of  constants, with exactly one corresponding to each possible value of 
lead time to delivery. 
20. The primary  distinction  between a futures price and a forward price is that the futures 
market is relatively large and well organized, with a high degree of standardization of contracts 
and commodities, well-refined tools and procedures to make contracts legally enforceable, and 
government regulation of trading behavior. 
21. For a spectrum of  different approaches to this issue,  see Chari and Jagannathan (1990), 
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As an alternative approach to specification, we start with Stein’s model of 
futures markets (see Stein 1987, chap. 2). Bias is proportional to the condi- 
tional (at time r)  variance of spot price at delivery time s, V,[P,]: 
(3) 
with h representing net hedging pressure (the excess supply of forward con- 
tracts were forward price set equal to the expected future spot price), and u a 
function of  such market characteristics as degree of risk aversion and relative 
numbers and types of different classes of market participants.**  The latter can 
reasonably be taken as relatively constant; the behavior of net hedging (as 
measured empirically in traditional commodities future markets) has also not 
been particularly volatile (Stein 1987, 63). In what follows, I assume that, 
over the relatively short time periods examined in this paper, the hedging pres- 
sure h can be taken as randomly varying around some fixed mean H,  that is, 
(4)  h, = H  + q,, 
with the q,  i.i.d., mean zero random disturbances. 
If  we  then take the additional step of  assuming that conditional variance 
V,[P,] is approximately proportionalz3 to s -  r,  lead time (with constant of 
proportionality a*), we then have 
with b = -Hu~/u.~~ 
If forward prices are unbiased, b is zero; if they exhibit normal backwarda- 
tion, b is negative. This specification effectively imposes a series of  linear 
constraints on the  less  restrictive specification of  a fixed,  stationary term 
structure  of  forward  contract prices  set  out  in  equation  (2), that  is,  that 
<(s - r) = b(s - r),  and can therefore be tested.25 
To actually estimate (3,  we may add on a mean zero random disturbance 
term, vr,  and (incorporating [4]) rewrite it as 
22. Other approaches to modeling futures prices can also yield a bias in forward price propor- 
tional to the conditional variance of price (see Newbery and Stiglitz 1981, chap. 13; and Newbery 
1987,445). 
23. Because V,[P,]  must equal zero, I have constrained the intercept of a linear approximation 
to equal zero. 
24. Or, with a deterministic supply and price given by adding permanent random shocks onto a 
deterministic inverse demand function, a conditional variance V,[P,]  proportional to s - r can be 
explicitly derived. 
25. That is, if the coefficient of the lead time dummy variable for a contract with a two-month 
lead time is constrained to equal two times the coefficient of  the dummy variable for a contract 
with a one-month lead time, the coefficient of the dummy variable for a three-month lead time is 
constrained to equal three times the coefficient of the dummy variable for a contract with a one- 
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Assuming rational  expectations,  the  expression in  braces  will  on  average 
equal zero, and we might wish to incorporate it, and all terms to its right, into 
a random disturbance term and not explicitly model the formation of expec- 
tations. However, the difference between conditional expectations and their 
future realization (the expression in braces in [6]), which becomes part of the 
error term in a regression equation, will generally be correlated with P, and 
therefore calls for more complex estimation strategies. My  approach will be 
to use instrumental variables. Note as well that the random disturbance term 
in (6) is explicitly heteroskedastic. 
I do not actually have data on spot prices for large user contracts; however, 
I did construct the time-series data on spot retail prices in the United States 
described earlier. Large-volume U.S. spot contract prices were assumed to be 
related to U. S,  retail spot prices by the relation 
(7)  Ps  = c + dRs, 
where R, is retail spot price at time s. The presumed constancy of this relation 
in the U.S. market can be used to identify changes in price differentials be- 
tween U.S. and European markets, with the use of appropriate dummy vari- 
ables (i.e., shifts in parameter c), even if  no U.S. contract data are actually 
available, in a sample composed exclusively of  European contracts. If  any 
U.S. contracts are available in the sample, actual differentials (distinct levels 
for the United States and Europe), as well as changes over time, are identified 
when (7)  is substituted into (6).  Thus, even if  data on U.S. contract data are 
unavailable over periods when price differentials between the United States 
and Europe are believed to have changed, we can still check for such changes 
by regressing European contract prices on U. S.  retail spot prices. 
Finally, note that the semiconductor industry habitually analyzes its prices 
on diagrams with logarithmic scales. I shall regard contract prices, and mod- 
els of pricing, as being set and analyzed in the logs of prices and will under- 
take  the  econometric  analysis of  chip  prices using  logarithmic functional 
forms. In equations (1)-(7), then,f,  and R should be read as the logarithms 
of the respective prices; the analysis is otherwise unchanged. 
5.4.3  Estimation 
The model to be estimated, which relates forward prices, by delivery date, 
to actual spot prices on that delivery date, assumes DRAM base price is de- 
scribed by  (7) and (6),  modified to take into account possible economies of 
scale in purchasing, costs of  special packaging, and possible price differen- 
tials specific to producer and consumer geographic region. This specification 
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with  u  a statistical disturbance term, and  Q  purchase  volume  in  thousand 
units.  “Package”  is  a dummy  variable  for specialty  packaging (PLCC for 
256K DRAMs, small outline for 1M DRAMs); “ven” are dummy variables 
that denote Korean, European, and American vendors (expressing price dif- 
ferentials as deviations from the price  quoted  by  a Japanese vendor);  and 
“eurt” are dummy variables introduced to measure differentials in prices paid 
by European consumers (relative to the North American market) over discrete 
periods of time. Retail spot prices lagged n periods and earlier were used to 
instrument Rs, with n chosen to exceed the maximum lead time (s - r)  before 
a contract began in the actual sample (to ensure that all instruments precede 
Rr and can reasonably be regarded as predetermined). 
Because the retail spot price series were constructed for only a single speed 
of DRAM for each density of chip, and because earlier analysis suggested that 
price changes over time varied substantially by  speed of chip for any given 
density, analysis was restricted to those contracts for which U.S.  retail spot 
price data relating to the appropriate speed had been constructed. Results are 
organized and discussed by chip density. 
256K DRAMs 
Because time-series data were constructed only for retail spot prices for 120 
ns, 256K  x  1 DRAMs (extended back to 1984 by linking to the International 
Trade Commission spot 256K DRAM price data), a subset of eighty-seven 
contracts covering 120 ns DRAMs, in DIP and PLCC packages, was used to 
estimate equation (8). The limited availability of historical time-series data on 
monthly spot prices meant that sample size was maximized by further restrict- 
ing the exercise to contracts with lead times of up to four months (two obser- 
vations with  seven-month lead times were eliminated from the sample as a 
result),  leaving eighty-five observations in the sample. Seventy-nine of the 
contracts were with European customers and six with American chip consum- 
ers. Six contracts were with Korean vendors, six with European producers, 
twenty-two with American firms, and the balance with Japanese companies. 
Coefficient estimates and asymptotic standard errors are shown in table 5.1. 
Only instrumental variable estimates are shown, but OLS parameter estimates 
were in all cases quite close to the instrumental variables estimates. Available 
data permitted the use of prices lagged from five to eight months prior to the 
contract start date (since the maximum contract lead time was four months) as 
instruments. 
Examination of the Dataquest regional contract price estimates led me to 
use four dummy variables to capture European price differentials prevailing at 
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Table 5.1  Econometric Analysis of 256K  DRAM Contracts (two-stage least squares 
regression) 
With Contract Length  Without Contract Length 
Variable  Variable 
Dependent variable 
Mean of dep. var. 
SE of regression 
No. of  observations 
SD of dep. var. 
Sum of  sqrd. residuals 
LogPRICE 
1.047 
0.205 
85 
0.326 
3.575 
LogPRICE 
1.047 
0.205 
85 
0.326 
3.575 
Constant 
LogQUAN 
LENGTH 
LEAD 
PLCC 
LogSPOT 
Vendor dummies: 
EURVEN 
KORVEN 
USVEN 
EUR 
ETA 
ETB 
ETC 
Time-period dummies: 
~~~ 
Results Corrected for Heteroskedasticity 
Coeff.  SE  CWff.  SE 
0.917  0.208*  0.921  0.204* 
-0.0376  0.0237  -  0.0374  0.0235 
0.000470  0.00624  ...  ... 
-0.0364  0.0210***  -  0.0363  0.0207*** 
0.103  0.0409**  0.104  0.0390* 
0.282  0.0737*  0.282  0.0717* 
-  0.0732  0.0514  -0.0738  0.0525 
0.0791  0.0561  0.0791  0.0559 
0.0139  0.0806  0.0138  0.0804 
-  0.147  0.121  -  0.148  0.118 
-0.118  0.0704***  -0.116  0.0721 
0.001 16  0.0783  0.00268  0.0815 
0.170  0.135  0.171  0.135 
HO:  No Europe4J.S. price 
differentials: Wald statistic, 
x2(4) = .2208 
*Reject hypothesis of equality with zero, two-tailed test,  I percent significance level. 
**Reject hypothesis of equality with zero, two-tailed test, 5 percent significance level. 
***Reject hypothesis of  equality with zero, two-tailed test,  10 percent significance level. 
variable with a value of  one for European contracts throughout the sample 
period (August 1985-January  1989), zero elsewhere; ETA, a dummy variable 
with  a value of  one for European customers during period  A (September 
1986-February  1987, the beginning of  the STA through the end of a period 
when Dataquest shows European prices somewhat lower than U.S. prices), 
zero in all other cases; ETB, equal to one for European contracts starting over 
March 1987-June  1988 (where the Dataquest data show European and Amer- 
ican prices moving more or less together), zero elsewhere; and ETC, equal to 
one when European customers’ contracts started during period C (July 1988- 176  Kenneth Flamm 
April 1989, when Dataquest showed European prices significantly higher than 
U.S.  prices), zero elsewhere. 
An initial specification test did not lead me to reject the null hypothesis of 
linearity in lead time (although not shown, a version of the model correspond- 
ing  to equation  [2]-with  an  unrestricted  term  structure,  using  individual 
monthly lead time dummies-was  first estimated).26  Because heteroskedastic 
disturbance terms are a distinct possibility (individual contract sizes ranged 
from five thousand to 8.9 million chips), heteroskedasticity-consistent  stan- 
dard errors were calculated. 
The coefficient of contract length was quite small and statistically indistin- 
guishable from zero at any reasonable significance level. (Two-tailed tests of 
significance were used for all coefficients.) The second half of table 5.1 shows 
the resulting estimates when this hypothesis is maintained; the coefficient es- 
timates show virtually no change. 
The coefficient of lead time was negative (suggesting bias in the forward 
price) and statistically significant at the 10  percent level but not at the 5 per- 
cent  level,  with  forward  price  declining  3.6 percent  with  every  additional 
month of lead time before delivery. None of the European price differential 
dummies were statistically distinguishable from zero at these significance lev- 
els. Indeed, the point estimates of European price differentials were generally 
negative,  except in period C, and most negative in period A, right after the 
signing of the STA. The grossly higher European 256K DRAM prices shown 
by  Dataquest data from July  1988 through early  1989 contrast with a much 
smaller estimate of this differential (about 2 percent higher in Europe) within 
my sample of contracts. A Wald test for the hypothesis that there were no price 
differentials between the United States and Europe, before and after the STA, 
does not permit us to reject this c~njecture.~~ 
Quantity discounts do not seem to be a significant factor. The statistically 
insignificant coefficient for units to be shipped suggests that increasing con- 
tract  volume  tenfold produces  a roughly  8 percent  decline  in  unit price, a 
modest discount.  I interpret this to mean, not that purchase volume is irrele- 
vant to pricing,  but that the relatively  large companies in my sample get the 
benefit of the largest volume discounts based on their overall status as a vol- 
ume account, not on the details of  individual contract transactions.  Plastic- 
leaded chip carrier (PLCC) packaging is associated with a statistically signif- 
icant premium. 
My point estimates indicate that Korean producers seem to have charged 8 
percent more for their 256K DRAMS than Japanese vendors over the entire 
period, but the estimated standard error is quite large, and the hypothesis of 
26. The Wald statistic was .0654, with three degrees of freedom; the null hypothesis cannot be 
27. The Wald  statistic, with four degrees of  freedom, was .221;  the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected at any reasonable significance level. 
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no difference in pricing cannot be rejected  at the 5 percent level. American 
and European producers also show pricing differences with Japanese compet- 
itors that are statistically insignificant at this level. 
1M DRAMs 
For 1M DRAMs, the retail  spot price time series that I have constructed 
covers 1M X  1 chips with 100 ns access times, in DIP packages, and extends 
back to June  1986. Available contract data for these chips in either DIP or 
small outline (SO) packages covered sixty-two observations, with the first two 
beginning in July 1986 and another eight negotiated before June 1987. Sample 
size was maximized by dropping these ten observations and including only the 
subset of  fifty-two contracts with lead times under eight months; the first con- 
tract  in  this reduced sample started in  June  1987, after the  STA had  been 
signed. 
Results appear in table 5.2 and are basically similar to those for 256K parts; 
heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard errors were again calculated.28 Exami- 
nation of  the Dataquest regional contract price estimates led me again to con- 
struct four dummy variables to capture European price differentials for 1M 
DRAMs at different contract start dates. First, a base Europe-U.S. dummy 
variable  for the entire sample period  (June  1987-January  1989) was  con- 
structed. Over most of this post-STA epoch, Dataquest showed European and 
American  1M DRAM prices  moving more or less together.  Other periods, 
when regional price differentials seem to show up in the Dataquest data, were 
accounted for by constructing additional dummy variables: these included pe- 
riod  A, June  1987-July  1987 (fragmentary  Dataquest  data show  European 
prices somewhat lower than U.S. prices at the beginning of  this period); pe- 
riod B, November  1987-January  1988 (where the Dataquest data again show 
European prices falling below American prices); and period C, April  1988- 
October 1988 (when Dataquest showed European prices significantly higher 
than U. S. prices). 
The European price differential dummies for the entire sample period and 
period  A were relatively  large, negative, and statistically significant at both 
the 5 and the I  percent levels, while the dummy for period B was small and 
statistically  insignificant.  The dummy for period C was positive and statisti- 
cally significant (at the 5 or 1 percent levels) but would imply that European 
prices were  slightly lower over this period. Thus, if one were to accept the 
notion of regional price differentials, European 1M prices generally appear to 
28. As before, only instrumental variable estimates are shown; OLS parameter estimates were 
in all cases relatively close to the instrumental variables estimates. Available data permitted the 
use of prices lagged from eight to eleven months prior to the contract start date as instruments. 
Eleven of the contracts were with American customers, forty-one with European customers. Four 
of the  contracts were with Korean chip producers, three with American companies, three with 
European vendors, and the balance were Japanese. Once more, an initial specification did not lead 
to rejection of the null hypothesis of linearity in lead time, at the 5 percent significance level. The 
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Table 5.2  Econometric Analysis of 1M DRAM Contracts (two-stage  least squares 
regression) 
With Contract Length  Without Contract Length 
Variable  Variable 
Dependent variable  LogPRICE  LogPRICE 
Mean of dep. var.  2.861  2.861 
SE  of regression  0.0838  0.0860 
No. of observations  52  52 
SD of dep. var.  0.144  0.144 
Sum of sqrd. residuals  0.365  0.385 
Results Corrected for Heteroskedasticity 
Coeff.  SE  CWff.  SE 
Constant  2.378  0.377*  2.431  0.343* 
LogQUAN  -0.0209  0.0165  -  0.0213  0.0165 
LENGTH  -0.00724  0.00353**  ...  ... 
LEAD  -  0.01 10  0.00609***  -0.0110  0.00584** * 
SOJ  0.0270  0.0324  0.0345  0.0325 
LogSPOT  0.219  0.109**  0.188  0.0997*** 
Vendor dummies: 
EURVEN  -0.0127  0.0366  -0.0162  0.0385 
KORVEN  0.108  0.0521**  0.106  0.0507** 
USVEN  0.0363  0.0243  0.0512  0.0258** 
ESTA  -0.156  0.0482*  -  0.145  0.0485* 
ETA  -0.187  0.0545*  -0.219  0.0506* 
ETB  0.00532  0.0375  -0.0133  0.0404 
ETC  0.0946  0.0359*  0.103  0.0325* 
Time-period dummies: 
HO:  No Europe-U.S. price dif- 
ferentials:  Wald  statistic, 
x2(4) = ,3036 
*Reject hypothesis of equality with zero, two-tailed test,  1 percent significance level. 
**Reject hypothesis of equality with zero, two-tailed test, 5 percent significance level. 
***Reject hypothesis of equality with zero, two-tailed test, 10 percent significance level. 
have been  somewhat lower than  those  in the  United  States and very  much 
lower in the summer of  1987. Using a joint test statistic, however, the hypoth- 
esis that there were no price differentials throughout the sample period could 
not be rejected.29 
64K DRAMS 
For 64K DRAMs, the  retail  spot price  time  series that  I  created covers 
64 x  1 chips with  150 ns access times, in DIP packages,  goes back to May 
29. The Wald statistic (four degrees of  freedom) was ,304; one cannot reject at any reasonable 
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1985, and ends in mid-1987. This series was extended back to February  1982 
by linking to data tabulated by the International Trade Commission (ITC) in 
the course of an antidumping investigation; it was extended forward to 1989 
by linking to a wholesale  price series based on data found in Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, converted into dollars at prevailing exchange rates.3o (I judge this 
composite index to be a significantly less accurate indicator of movements in 
the U.S.  retail  spot market than the series used for  1M and 256K DRAMs, 
and this caveat should be borne in mind when interpreting my results.) Avail- 
able data for these chips in DIP packages covered fifty-one contracts, with the 
first one beginning  in April  1985 and the last in February  1989. Maximum 
lead time was six months, so I was able to use all observations in this sample. 
Forty-four of the purchasers  were European companies, the balance Ameri- 
can. Two of the contracts involved vendors who were Korean, three were with 
European producers, eleven dealt with American firms, and the balance were 
with Japanese companies. 
Results are displayed in table 5.3 and again, are basically  similar to those 
for 256K DRAMS.~]  Available data permitted the use of prices lagged from 
seven to ten months prior to the contract start date as instruments.  Since no 
Dataquest regional contract price estimates are available for 64K DRAMs, the 
same four dummy variables used to capture European price differentials for 
256K DRAMs at different contract start dates were used for 64K DRAMs. 
All four European price differential dummies were statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level, and two were statistically significant at the  1 percent 
level. The pattern of differentials  associated with these estimates is of Euro- 
pean 64K DRAM prices falling almost 20 percent lower than U.S. prices prior 
to the signing of the STA, then gradually rising to a level almost 20 percent 
greater by early 1989. 
Summary 
An econometric analysis of  DRAM contract price data for three successive 
generations  of  memory  chips has  supported  several  general  propositions. 
First, the simple model of the term structure of forward prices that I am using 
seems quite consistent with these data: formal statistical tests did not reject it, 
and estimated coefficients were largely unaffected by imposition of this set of 
constraints.  Second, my a priori suggestion that, beyond the initial purchase 
at  the  contracted  price,  these  contracts  mainly  represent  quantity  commit- 
ments  is supported  by  the generally  small magnitudes  and  statistical insig- 
30. Quarterly ITC data for spot-market sales of 64K DRAMs in  quantities of under  10,OOO 
chips were imputed to the middle month of every quarter, and data for the remaining months of 
each quarter were produced by interpolation between these mid-quarter observations. Because my 
retail spot price series began in May 1985, only a small number of observations relied on these 
interpolated ITC data. 
3 1. As before, an initial specification test leads one not to reject the null hypothesis of linearity 
in lead time, at any reasonable significance level. The Wald statistic was ,389, with five degrees 
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Table 5.3  Econometric Analysis of 64K DRAM Contracts (two-stage  least squares 
regression) 
With Contract Length  Without Contract Length 
Variable  Variable 
Dependent variable 
Mean of dep. var. 
SE of regression 
No. of observations 
SD of  dep. var. 
Sum of sqrd. residuals 
LogPRICE 
-0.0191 
0.177 
51 
0.368 
1.604 
LogPRICE 
-0.0191 
0.178 
0.368 
1.610 
51 
Results Corrected for Heteroskedasticity 
COeff.  SE  Coeff.  SE 
Constant 
LogQUAN 
LENGTH 
LEAD 
LogSPOT 
Vendor dummies: 
EURVEN 
KORVEN 
USVEN 
EUR 
ETA 
ETB 
ETC 
Time-period dummies: 
-0.241 
-0.0156 
0.00669 
-  0.0644 
1.248 
0.0343 
0.313 
-0.0196 
-0.205 
0.245 
0.307 
0.449 
0.153 
0.0221 
0.00827 
0.0185* 
0.449* 
0.104 
0.136** 
0.0722 
0.0868** 
0.0698* 
0.0954* 
0.225*  * 
0.232  0.152 
-0.0113  0.0206 
-  0.067  1  0.0183* 
1.359  0.398* 
0.0466  0.106 
0.332  0.134** 
-  0.0293  0.0688 
-0.201  0.0868** 
0.256  0.067  1  * 
0.294  0.095  1  * 
0.390  0.208*** 
HO: No Europe-U.S. price 
differentials: Wald statistic, 
~~(4)  = .5392 
*Reject hypothesis of  equality with zero, two-tailed test, 1 percent significance level. 
**Reject hypothesis of equality with zero, two-tailed test, 5 percent significance level. 
***Reject hypothesis of equality with zero, two-tailed test,  10 percent significance level. 
nificance  of the coefficients  of  contract  length as a determinant  of  contract 
pricing. 
Analysis of price differentials faced by American and European purchasers 
of  DRAMS suggested much smaller differentials than had been indicated by 
the Dataquest Monday contract price data, and, overall, I could not reject the 
null hypothesis of no regional differences. The sign of point estimates of these 
differentials  was  generally  consistent  with  the  pattern  suggested  by  Data- 
quest’s numbers, however. 
The general pattern that emerged of  Korean vendors, selling their product 
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 participant^.^^ It suggests that Korean producers were following an opportun- 
istic pricing strategy focused on short-run rent extraction in marginal demand 
not covered by long-term contracts with other producers,  rather than the es- 
tablishment of long-term  relationships with a stable set of  customers.  In ef- 
fect, in a period of scarcity, the Korean producers may have charged a higher 
price  than  the  long-term contract  price,  approaching  the  spot grey  market 
price, while,  in a period of  glut, the Koreans would charge a lower price, 
again approaching  the spot grey market price.  Since Korean product in my 
sample was shipped only during periods of  relatively tight markets (i.e., after 
1986, through early 1989), this would explain the positive differential on con- 
tracts for Korean product.  This analysis is also consistent with the reports in 
the trade press on Korean producer Samsung’s dealing with its American dis- 
tributors.  B3 
In my model, the coefficient of  lead time measures the “bias” in forward 
prices.  My empirical results supported the presence of “normal backwarda- 
tion” in  forward contract prices  for DRAMs. My point of departure  was a 
model in which bias in forward prices serves to compensate purchasers for the 
transfer of risk to them by producers. The rather dramatic decline of  the bias 
term from the 64K generation of DRAMs, to the 256K generation, to the 1M 
generation, suggests  that  the  market  viewed  prices  for current  generation 
chips as considerably less volatile than previous generations of chips. This, of 
course, was precisely what the administrative pricing guidelines and mecha- 
nisms imposed on the DRAM market with the advent of the STA would have 
been expected to accomplish. 
5.5  Improved Price Indexes for DRAMs 
The econometric results presented above can be used to address several of 
the many problems in existing data on DRAM prices surveyed earlier. Leav- 
ing aside data and sampling issues, those problems can be grouped into two 
distinct categories:  problems  related  to product heterogeneity and problems 
related to the aggregation of prices over time. 
This first  problem  is  the  variety  of  products  and  distribution  channels. 
While at one time DRAMs of given density were a relatively  homogeneous 
product, the proliferation of organizations,  packaging, and speeds has meant 
32. One Korean producer-Samsung-was  responsible for the vast majority of Korean DRAM 
sales over the period covered in this sample. 
33. At the peak of the DRAM shortage, in the summer of  1988, Samsung attempted to hike its 
prices to levels that its American distributors protested left them uncompetitive and temporarily 
ended price protection for distributors (see Elecfronic News,  15 August  1988, 47; 27 February 
1989, 27; 3 April  1989, 35).  When prices turned down sharply in early 1990, Samsung shocked 
its American distributors by doing away with the customary “price protection” altogether. Ameri- 
can distributors complained bitterly about Samsung’s “broker mentality” (see  Elecrronic News,  22 
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that the volume-weighted averages published by industry sources now aggre- 
gate over a large variety of different parts,  so that changes in product  mix 
within a sample-as  well as transaction size if there are quantity discounts- 
may produce significant changes in average prices. The existence of multiple 
distribution channels-larger  user volume contracts, authorized distributors, 
and grey market brokers-means  that shifts among distribution channels may 
also affect average prices in unpredictable ways. 
The second  complication  stems from  the  fact that  chip sales  are  often 
embedded in forward contracts,  so we can associate a chip sales price with 
both negotiation and delivery dates. From the standpoint of measuring com- 
pany revenues or a producer price index, for example, one might choose to 
measure average sales or billing prices, the actual average price received per 
chip shipped in a given period.  These are essentially shipment-weighted av- 
erages of prices on contracts booked both in the past (subject to some revision) 
and in the current period. 
However, for an economist interested in the cost of chips as an input to the 
production of other products, it may be useful to have some notion of current 
market cost, at the margin, of additional supplies of that input. The current 
“average” booking price will not do; it is actually a weighted average of the 
current market price for spot contract deliveries and expected market prices in 
future periods when  deliveries on contracts with future delivery  dates will 
begin, further complicated by the possible existence of discounts in pricing 
for future delivery due to “normal backwardation.” An ideal measure of cur- 
rent input cost arguably would measure the price of the input for immediate 
delivery only (with booking price equal to billing price) since this is the true 
opportunity cost relevant to a consumer of the product at the moment of use. 
I turn next to the construction of price  indexes that address both  sets of 
concerns, using the empirical results of the preceding section. Since virtually 
all the technological improvements in DRAMS-in  the form of greater den- 
sity, novel  organizations,  smaller power consumption,  and faster speeds- 
have been embodied in the introduction of distinctive new product types, deal- 
ing in a satisfactory way with the effect of product differentiation is equivalent 
to constructing a quality-adjusted price index for DRAMs. 
5.5.1 
The first step was to calculate the average sales price for as many distinct 
types of DRAMs as possible, for which contract data were available in relative 
abundance (so a reasonable  approximation  to  a time  series could  be  con- 
structed). For 1M and 256K DRAMs, this meant using data for ‘‘x  1” orga- 
nized chip types of two speeds and “  x  4” organized chip types of one speed, 
in DIP, SO, and PLCC packages. For 64K  DRAMs, this meant using data on 
“X  1” organized  DRAMs of  two distinct speeds,  in DIP packages.  Alto- 
gether,  116 contracts for 1M  chips, 196 contracts for 256K  chips, and 71 
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contracts for 64K chips were used to construct quarterly price indexes span- 
ning the period from the second quarter of  1985 to the first quarter of 1989.34 
In constructing my price indexes, two adjustments were made to the origi- 
nal data, to control for variance in price attributable to quantity and packag- 
ing. All prices were adjusted to a quantity 100,000 basis, using the estimated 
coefficients reported  in the empirical results above. (Although the estimated 
coefficients for quantity discounts were small and had relatively large standard 
errors, a priori knowledge  suggests the existence of some discount.)  These 
coefficients were assumed to apply to all chips of the same density, including 
those with speeds and organizations different from those used for the econo- 
metric analysis. (A 256K  X  4, 100 ns 1M DRAM, e.g., was assumed to face 
the same quantity  discount  structure as a  1M  X  I, 120 ns DRAM.) Also, 
chips packaged in PLCC and SO cases were adjusted to a DIP package basis 
using the coefficients estimated 
It was further assumed that product shipped under a contract was delivered 
at the start of the contract at the negotiated price. (Renegotiation of price was 
assumed to affect only deliveries after this initial delivery.) Thus, for every 
contract, the negotiated price was attributed to the quarter in which product 
was first shipped. Individual contract prices were weighted  using total con- 
tract  quantity  divided  by the  length of the contract (an estimate of  average 
monthly delivery volume under the contract), to produce a weighted average 
quarterly shipment price for each type of chip.36  The products of these average 
prices (after “adjustment” to a quantity 100,000, DIP package basis) and their 
quantity weights were then used to produce estimates of total (adjusted) ex- 
penditure shares on chips of various types within this sample. 
Table  5.4 shows  how  rapidly  the  distribution  of  (adjusted)  expenditure 
shifted historically within the sample, as new types of chips were brought to 
market. The extraordinary  speed with  which these expenditure  shares shift 
34. For 1M DRAMs in DIP or SO packages, 62 observations on 100 ns  1M  x  1 parts (52 of 
which had been used in the econometric analysis of the last section), 26 observations on 120 ns 
1M  x  1 parts, and 28 observations on 120 ns 256K  x  4 chips were used. For 256K DRAMs in 
DIP or PLCC packages,  there were 87 observations on  120 ns 256K  X  1  chips (85 of  these 
observations had been used in our econometric sample), 75 contracts for 150 ns 256K  x  1 chips, 
and 34 observations for 120 ns 64K  X  4  parts.  For 64K DRAMs in DIP packages only, there 
were 51 observations on 150 ns 64K  x  1 chips and 21 contracts for 120 ns 64K  X  1 chips. One 
extreme outlier for 120 ns 64K DRAMs was discarded in the belief that package type had been 
incorrectly reported, resulting in a total of 71 contracts used to construct price indexes for 64K 
DRAMs. 
35. Obviously, this assumes a fixed price differential between DIP and these other packaging 
types. 
36. Note that, because the coefficient estimates are derived from a model linear in logarirhrns, I 
am actually adjusting the log of price, then taking the antilog, in deriving an estimate of price. As 
an experiment, price indexes were also calculated using total volume over the entire length of the 
contract as the quantity weight for a contract price associated with the quarter in which first ship- 
ments occurred; these alternative weights had only a slight effect on the actual indexes. 184  Kenneth Flamm 
Table 5.4  Estimated Distribution of (Adjusted)  Expenditure: Percentage of 
Sample Total, by Chip Density 
Period 
Entire 4 Years, 
85:2-86:  1  86~2-87~1  87:2-88:1  88:2-89:  1  85:2-89:1 
1M DRAMs: 
256K  x 4,12011s 
1024K x  1,120ns 
1024K x  1,100ns 
256K  x  1,150 ns 
256K  x  1,120 ns 
64K  x 4,12011s 
64K  X  1,150ns 
64K  X  1,12011s 
256K DRAMs: 
64K DRAMs: 
N.A. 
0.19 
0.81 
0.79  0.41 
0.21  0.59 
N.A.  N.A. 
0.80  0.71 
0.20  0.29 
0.11  0.22 
0.03  0.08 
0.87  0.71 
0.15  0.05 
0.81  0.62 
0.04  0.33 
0.76  0.55 
0.24  0.45 
0.20 
0.07 
0.72 
0.22 
0.58 
0.20 
0.71 
0.29 
Note: N.A.  = not available. Chip prices adjusted to lOOK  quantity, DIP package basis, and are 
weighted using  average monthly  contract  volume, to calculate adjusted expenditure. Contract 
prices are assumed to be in effect in the month in which contract deliveries start. No adjustment 
for regional price differentials or lead time has been made. 
suggests that very frequent updating of  products sampled is essential in con- 
structing accurate price indexes for semiconductors. 
The weighted average quarterly prices produced by the procedure outlined 
above are averages for the entire  sample of contracts.  Implicitly,  their con- 
struction maintains the hypothesis of no regional price differentials between 
European and American DRAM consumers.  As we have seen, however, the 
econometric evidence suggests that significant regional differentials may very 
well have existed. 
An alternative average price for every type of  chip may be calculated by 
further “adjusting” all prices in the sample to either an American or a Euro- 
pean basis. This was accomplished by using the regionalltime-period dummy 
variables’ estimated coefficients from the econometric analysis described ear- 
lier, either to adjust all prices reported  by European buyers to an American 
equivalent to produce a U.S  .-basis price or, conversely, to convert American 
contract prices to a European eq~ivalent.~’  The three sets of volume-weighted, 
37. This procedure  was slightly more complicated  in the case of  1M DRAMs because the 
econometric sample began after the start of the STA. Rather than assume that the initial post-STA 
U.S.-Europe differential was identical  to that of  the pre-STA period,  only prices reported  by 
American customers were used to construct the US.-basis series for quarters prior to the beginning 
of the sample used in the econometric analysis. Similarly, only actual European contract prices 
were used to construct the European-based indexes for quarters prior to the start of the statistical 
analysis. For this reason, the U.S.- and European-basis price indexes for 1M DRAMs are avail- 
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adjusted average contract prices so produced will be referred to as being on a 
“sample basis,” “U.  S.  basis,” or “European basis.” 
A final issue to be addressed was how to weight average billing prices for 
different types of chips of a given density to produce a single price index for 
that given density. The question was complicated by the sporadic absence of 
data for some particular types of DRAMs in a particular quarter, which made 
some sort of imputation procedure to deal with missing data necessary. 
The solution adopted in addressing this problem was to divide the overall 
sample into four periods of four quarters, with each period ending in the first 
quarter of one of the years 1986-89  (these are the same periods shown in table 
5.4). In the final quarter of each of these subperiods (i.e., in 1986:  1, 1987: 1, 
1988:  1, and  1989:  l), data were fortuitously available for all chip types actu- 
ally consumed over the four-quarter period. The final quarter of each of these 
four periods was therefore taken to be a “base” period. The share of cumula- 
tive expenditure on different types of  DRAMs (reported in table 5.4) over the 
four adjacent quarters ending in this “base” quarter was judged to be an ac- 
ceptable estimate of the actual expenditure shares in the general population of 
DRAM contracts for chips of that density in  the final “base” quarter. Thus, 
average prices and estimates of  expenditure shares on each type of  DRAM 
sold in significant numbers, for 64K, 256K, and 1M DRAMs, respectively, 
were constructed for four quarters spaced  one year apart,  from  1986:l to 
1989:l. 
This is precisely the information needed to calculate a Fisher Ideal price 
index,  which  Diewert  (1978)  has  shown  to  be  a  “superlative index”-a 
second-order approximation to a true, exact price comparison between two 
periods derived from microeconomic theory. Because virtually all technical 
innovation in DRAMs has been embodied in the introduction of distinctive 
new products, a Fisher Ideal price comparison between two periods, if avail- 
able, will provide a good approximation to the economic effects of technolog- 
ical change. That is, technological advance in DRAMs has mainly been re- 
flected in the rapid cheapening of newer, more advanced products relative to 
older products, and a Fisher Ideal index will capture the economic effects of 
this  technical  improvement (as well  as  whatever other factors may  affect 
prices) on DRAM producers or consumers. The Fisher Ideal price index giv- 
ing price in period 1 relative to period 0 is 
I 
I thus calculated Fisher Ideal price indexes for DRAMs of varying organi- 
zations and  speeds,  for  any  given density,  in order to  produce a quality- 
adjusted measure of DRAM cost. The rates of  change for DRAM cost asso- 
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Table 5.5  Annual  DRAM Price Changes: Fisher Ideal Comparisons  versus 
Volume-Weighted Averages (percentage rate of change, average- 
selling-price  basis estimates of first shipment contract price) 
DRAM  1986-87  1987-88  1988-89 
1M: 
E basis: 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
U basis: 
S basis: 
256K: 
E basis: 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
U basis: 
S basis: 
64K: 
E basis: 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
U basis: 
S basis: 
NA 
NA 
8.70" 
8.8la 
5.31 
3.91 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
0.83 
-0.57 
NA 
NA 
15.37a 
18.19" 
2.42 
1.50 
8.72 
21.61 
25.20" 
29.60" 
56.18 
54.84 
11.29 
16.60 
18.63' 
15.17" 
38.32 
38.39 
3.28 
11.69 
29.W 
29.93" 
59.87 
59.18 
35.17 
33.61 
24.44 
24.53 
75.40 
67.72 
4.64 
3.51 
19.80 
20.17 
59.35 
52.57 
34.64 
33.04 
24.49 
24.68 
58.98 
54.99 
Nore: All year-to-year changes are from first quarter of the first year to first quarter of the second 
year. All reported contract prices have been adjusted to a quantity  lOo,OOO,  DIP package basis 
using the econometric results described above. "Average-selling-price basis first shipment con- 
tract price"  means the volume-weighted average (using average quarterly contract volume, for 
given chip characteristics)  of contract prices for contracts with first shipments scheduled for a 
given quarter, with no adjustment for variation of lead time from contract negotiation date to first 
shipment date.  Volume-weighted average price  is an average for all chips of  a given density, 
including chips of varying speeds and organizations. Fisher Ideal indexes are calculated with the 
Fisher  ideal price index formula, using separate volume-weighted average prices for chips of 
differing densities, speeds, and organizations. Expenditure share weights have been approximated 
as the cumulative four-quarter sum (through a given first quarter) of adjusted (for quantity and 
packaging variation) contract price times average quarterly contract volume, for contracts with 
first shipments  beginning  over that four-quarter  period.  E, U  basis: Reported  prices  adjusted 
using timelregion dummy variables to European and U.S.  customer basis. S basis: No adjustment 
made to reported price in sample other than to lOo,OOO  quantity, DIP package basis. NA  = not 
available. 
=Not  a true Fisher Ideal because of missing price for products introduced over this period. Missing 
prices are implicitly assumed to change exactly as a subindex based only on chips with available 
price data changes.  As discussed in the text, this probably adds a positive bias to the estimated 
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of price per bit, a simple volume-weighted index often reported within the in- 
dustry.38 
Although table 5.5 correctly computes a Fisher Ideal price comparison be- 
tween  1988:l  and  1989:l  and  between  1986:l  and  1987:1, the  numbers 
shown for 1988:l relative to 1987:l are likely to be biased upward in the case 
of both 256K and 1M DRAMs. This is because new products were introduced 
in my samples after 1987:  1 and a price for these products was not reported in 
1987:l and earlier.39  The unobserved price (the product was most likely avail- 
able, but only in small or sample quantities) was therefore assumed to move 
as the weighted average of the observed prices (using end-period expenditure 
weights). Because prices for new products may generally be expected to fall 
more rapidly (or increase less quickly) than prices for more mature products 
within this industry, the denominator in the expression for the Fisher Ideal 
index (a Paasche index comparing period 0 with period 1) would in this case 
be biased downward and the resulting index number therefore biased upward. 
Since a price index based simply on price per bit, or per chip, for given 
density effectively ignores quality change associated with improvements in 
chip speed and organization, table 5.5 also shows what sort of price is paid in 
terms of  bias when these additional quality adjustments are not made. The 
answer, over the rather unusual historical period portrayed in table 5.5 (with 
prices generally rising), is that unadjusted price per chip behaved very much 
like the Fisher Ideal price index, subject to occasional large errors. Remark- 
ably, the rate of  change of  simple, current volume-weighted price per chip 
was within 5 or 10 percent of the quality-adjusted Fisher Ideal comparison for 
DRAMs of that density, most of the time.40  Occasional large divergences are 
apparent, however, suggesting that chained price indexes based on simple av- 
erage sales price would generally be less reliable shortcut approximations to 
Fisher Ideal indexes than straight comparisons between pairs of periods. 
5.5.2  Construction of Spot-Basis Contract Prices 
Earlier, I noted that the billing price in a chip contract can be interpreted as 
an estimate at the time a contract was negotiated of the spot price of the chip 
38. Note that, for chips of  any given density, average cost per bit is a scalar multiple of  average 
cost per chip. Thus, a price index giving price in period  I  relative to price in period 0, based on 
cost per either bit or chip, amounts to 
39. As Diewert (1987) notes, the theoretically correct  procedure is to use the imputed (but 
unobserved) price that would have just reduced consumption to zero, if consumption is truly nil. 
40.  One exception is a comparison of  1986:  I  to 1987:l. for 256K DRAMs, where there is a 
substantial difference. Further examination suggests this was due to an unusual mix of chip types 
purchased in  1986:  1 within my sample, one that differed substantially from the mix in the other 
quarters within this period. 188  Kenneth Flamm 
at its shipping date, less a possible discount reflecting the transfer of risk from 
seller to buyer (normal backwardation). It is the spot price at shipment that 
determines the true current opportunity cost of  an input to a consumer, how- 
ever, and this may be a more useful measure of price for studies of input use. 
One way to estimate what contract price applied to spot transactions is to 
restrict the sample of contracts to those in which shipments began in the same 
month as the negotiations concluded. Recall that 44 percent of the contracts 
for 64K parts, 41 percent of the contracts for 265K DRAMs, and 29 percent 
of  the  1M contracts were to begin  in the month negotiated. Because such 
“spot” contracts accounted for well under half the contracts in  this sample, 
however, an index calculated from such a subset of the data would have many 
“holes” and require much ad hoc linking to other quarters using subsets of the 
products in the index. 
The model of  contract pricing used in the econometric work suggests an 
alternative procedure that makes more complete use of  available data. Sup- 
pose we were able to estimate the risk premium embedded in a particular 
contract (based on the lead time to first delivery for that contract), which in 
turn is subtracted from a reported contract price in order to produce an esti- 
mate of the forecast future spot price implicit within the contract price. The 
assumed rationality of  price expectations implies that a weighted average of 
forecasts of future spot price derived from contracts for some given shipment 
date will  be  an unbiased predictor of  the actual spot price at the shipment 
date.4’ Inspired by  this logic, the econometric results were used to calculate 
“zero  lead  time”  equivalents of  observed  contract prices.  These  adjusted 
“spot-basis’’ contract prices for first shipments of DRAMs in any given quar- 
ter were combined with actual “spot” contract prices in price index numbers 
constructed using the procedures described above; rates of change are shown 
on a sample, American, and European basis in table 5.6. 
Because both table 5.5 and table 5.6 are based only on data for shipments 
on contracts beginning in a given quarter, they may be expected to show less 
41. More formally, let <, be an “implicit” forecast of spot price at time s derived from obser- 
vation i on forward contract price negotiated at time r, and an adjustment for normal backwarda- 
tion. Assuming rational expectations, E,[c,  -  P,]  = 0. The estimator that I am constructing for 
Pr is ZJ,w,F:,, the quantity-weighted average of these adjusted forward prices, with w,,  = Q,,/ 
ZJ,  Q,,  < 1, ZJ,  w,, = 1, and Q,  quantity associated with contract i negotiated at time r (for 
adjusted, “spot-basis” period-s price F;,). A substantial number of these contracts involve r  = s; 
i.e., I assume that actual “spot” prices reported contracts vary randomly around some unobserved 
“market” price. The bias of this estimator of P,  is 
“,C,  w,P:,) - P,I  = ZJ,  w,F(F:, -  P,) = 2,Zr  w,(W,(F:,  - P$l  = 27,  wJ(0)  = 0. 
Thus, a weighted average of conditionally unbiased estimates of  spot price at time s will produce 
an unbiased estimate of P,. 
Since the econometric model that I have actually used is specified in the logs of  prices,  not 
actual prices, and my coefficient estimates are consistent but not unbiased, I am limited to claim- 
ing asymptotic virtues for my procedure, i.e., that plim 27,  WJ;,  -  E(PJ = 0. 189  Measurement of DRAM Prices: Technology and Market Structure 
Table 5.6  Annual DRAM Price Changes: Fisher Ideal Comparisons versus 
Volume-Weighted Averages (percentage rate of change, spot-basis 
estimates of first shipment contract price) 
DRAM  1986-87  1987-88  1988-89 
1M: 
E basis: 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
U basis: 
S basis: 
256K: 
E basis: 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
U basis: 
S basis: 
64K: 
E basis: 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
Vol. weighted Average 
Fisher ideal 
U basis: 
S basis: 
NA 
NA 
9.42 
9.62 
5.75 
4.45 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
1.19 
-  .10 
NA 
NA 
16.17 
19.10 
2.83 
2.01 
9.57 
20.04 
27.48 
33.28 
57.57 
56.20 
12.48 
15.39 
20.29 
17.91 
39.89 
39.86 
4.25 
10.39 
31.92 
33.32 
61.47 
60.73 
50.33 
46.65 
16.93 
17.97 
84.07 
74.94 
16.38 
13.55 
12.57 
14.00 
67.22 
59.11 
49.78 
46.08 
16.97 
18.14 
66.63 
62.05 
Nore: As in table 5.5, with the following exception. “Spot-basis first shipment contract price” 
means the volume-weighted  average of contract prices for contracts with first shipments sched- 
uled for a given quarter, with an additional adjustment for variation of lead time from contract 
negotiation date to first shipment date.  A discount for future delivery at later dates, reflecting 
“normal backwardation,” is used to “gross up” actual contract price. The resulting average may 
be interpreted as the average expected spot price for all contracts written with some given future 
first delivery date. 
“inertia” than a producer price index derived from shipments on all contracts, 
including  any older contracts from previous quarters  whose terms have not 
been revised during the current quarter. Table 5.6 further “grosses up” those 
prices negotiated in advance of  actual shipments to include the implicit dis- 
count due to “normal backwardation,”  in order to estimate the spot market 
price. 
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research, and to construct these I implemented a procedure suggested recently 
by  Triplett (1989b),  to calculate what  he  terms “Times-series Generalized 
Fisher Ideal” (TGFI) price indexes. Fixed expenditure weight price indexes 
for “spot-basis” contract prices were calculated using each of the base quarters 
within our four periods as the base for a price index. Over the four quarters 
from  one  base  quarter  to  another,  the  index  calculated using  the  initial 
quarter as the base (and source of  data for expenditure weights) is the Las- 
peyres price index, the index using the end quarter as the base is a (rebased) 
Paasche price index, and the geometric mean of these two indexes is Triplett’s 
TGFI index. Base quarter to base quarter TGFI price indexes were then linked 
at base quarters to form a single price index over all sixteen quarters. The 
indexes so constructed are shown in table 5.7, on an unadjusted (sample) ba- 
sis, along with adjustments made to reflect regional price differentials in Eu- 
ropean or American markets. 
For base quarter to base quarter comparisons, the TGFI is identical to a 
Fisher Ideal index and therefore is a superlative price index. For the quarters 
in between, the TGFI is not a second-order approximation to an exact price 
index, however, and is merely the geometric mean of fixed-weight price in- 
dexes bounding the true price comparison. Rates of change between the first- 
quarter (base-period) index numbers shown in  table 5.7  produce the Fisher 
Ideal comparisons given in table 5.6. 
The TGFI that I have calculated is “approximate,” in at least three senses. 
First, I have already noted that newly introduced chips were assumed to de- 
cline at the same rate as a weighted average of  older products, before their 
entry into the sample, a procedure that, as argued, probably induces some 
positive bias in estimated rates of change in such periods. Second, cumulative 
expenditure by  type of  chip over the four-quarter period ending in the base 
quarter is being used as an estimate of  the true expenditure weights for the 
base quarter. Finally (and  inevitably, given the relatively  small size of  the 
sample), price and quantity data on particular products were sometimes lack- 
ing even after they had first been introduced within the sample. In these cases, 
the Laspeyres or Paasche price indexes were chained to an adjacent quarter, 
using a subset of  prices available in both adjoining quarters and the corre- 
sponding expenditure weights for this subset of prices.42 
The same set of procedures could also be applied without any correction for 
lead time to delivery, producing an estimated TGFI price index for average 
selling prices (or billing prices) of  first shipments from sample contracts, by 
quarter of first delivery. The TGFI indexes on an “average-selling-price  basis” 
are compared with the “spot-basis” indexes in figure 5.3, for 256K and  1M 
DRAMS. The differences are small in  most quarters. This probably reflects 
the relatively short lead times in most contracts, the generally small estimated 
42. This is noted in table 5.8 below. When chaining to an adjacent quarter, I adopted the con- 
vention of chaining in the direction of  the base quarter for the index being chained. 191  Measurement of  DRAM Prices: Technology and Market Structure 
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854  86:4  87:4  88:4 
Quarter 
1 +  1  M US Spot TGFl  t  256K US Spot TGFl -jy- 1  M US ASP TGFl  *  256K US  ASP TGFl  1 
Fig. 5.3  Average selling price vs. spot basis, first shipped price 
effects of “normal backwardation,” and the fact that implicit short-term expec- 
tations about future price movements generally seem to have been relatively 
accurate (i.e., true “spot” contract prices were quite close to “adjusted” spot- 
basis prices in contracts negotiated in earlier quarters). 
Finally, the price indexes constructed here, combined with the coefficients 
from the econometric analysis, can be used to analyze price differentials be- 
tween the U.S. and the European markets. This is done by setting U.S. price 
in the first quarter of  1988 equal to one, then using the estimated differential 
between European and American prices in the third quarter of  1988 (which is 
completely encompassed in one of the regiodtime-dummy  variables used in 
the econometric models) to link the European price index to the American 
price index in that quarter. The results of  this procedure are also shown in 
figures 5.4 and 5.5 and are contrasted with  the regional price differentials 
shown by Dataquest in its Monday contract prices over the same period. Both 
Dataquest and the estimates constructed here show slightly lower prices in 
Europe in 1987. Where Dataquest shows substantially higher prices in Europe 
in 1988 for 1M DRAMs (and huge differentials for 256K DRAMs), however, 
the present sample’s data indicate only marginally higher European prices. 
I conclude that the price indexes constructed for this paper do not diverge 
significantly from Dataquest’s prior to 1987 but show some significant differ- 
ences after that period. European-U.S. differentials, in particular, seem quite Table 5.7  Approximate Time-Series Generalized Fisher Ideal DRAM Price Indices, 1988:l = 1, ("spot-basis'' first shipment contract prices) 
1M DRAM  256K DRAM  64  K DRAM 
E Basis  U Basis  S Basis  E Basis  U Basis  S Basis  E Basis  U Basis  S Basis 
VWCP  TFGI  VWCP  TGFI  VWCP  TGFI  VWCP  TGFl  VWCP  TGFI  VWCP  TGFI  VWCP  TGFI  VWCP  TGFI  VWCP  TGFI 
19852 
19853 
1985:4 
1986:  1 
19862 
1986:3 
1986:4 
1987:  1 
1987:2 
1987:3 
1987:4 
1988:  1 
1988:2 
1988:3 
1988:4 
1989:  1 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
0.91 
0.78 
0.77 
0.71 
1  .OO 
1.06 
1.17 
1.13 
1.06 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
0.91" 
0.80" 
0.78'' 
0.72'' 
1  .OO 
1.01c 
1.17 
1.14* 
1.04 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
0.68 
NA 
NA 
NA 
0.86 
0.70 
1  .OO 
1.02 
1.04 
1.01 
1.01 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
0.71a 
NA 
NA 
NA 
0.87b 
0.71b 
1 .OO 
1.02c 
1.04 
1.02d 
1  .OO 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
0.75 
NA 
0.86 
0.74 
0.73 
0.67 
1  .OO 
1.02 
1.11 
1.10 
1.03 
NA  0.89  O.9le 
NA  1.05  1.05 
NA  NA  NA 
NA  0.72  0.63 
NA  0.86  0.78' 
0.71"  0.86  0.74 
NA  NA  NA 
0.840  0.78  0.75" 
0.74"  0.96  0.89" 
0.73b  0.85  0.85" 
0.67b  NA  0.818 
1.00  1.00  1.00 
0.97'  1.17  1.15'' 
1.10  1.24  1.35 
1.1W  1.29  1.17h 
1.02  1.58  1.56 
0.91  1.0s" 
1.06  1.22 
NA  NA 
0.74  0.73 
0.70  0.72' 
0.88  0.87 
NA  NA 
0.83  0.85" 
0.86  0.90" 
0.87  0.91" 
NA  0.838 
1.00  1.00 
1.21  1.21h 
1.26  1.27 
1.18  1.07h 
1.40  1.40 
0.90  0.99' 
1.05  1.13 
NA  NA 
0.73  0.68 
0.77  0.75' 
0.87  0.81 
NA  NA 
0.76  0.75" 
0.89  0.89" 
0.86  0.88' 
NA  0.828 
1.00  1.00 
1.19  1.17'' 
1.26  1.37 
1.35  1.21" 
1.61  1.61 
0.50  0.49 
NA  NA 
0.57  0.58 
0.72  0.74 
0.79  0.77 
NA  NA 
0.86  0.85 
0.80  0.80 
0.60  0.4gk 
1.23  1.32' 
1.00  1.00 
1.54  1.52 
NA  NA 
NA  NA 
1.84  1.75 
0.50  0.471 
0.67 
0.67 
NA 
0.76 
0.97 
1.05 
NA 
0.89 
0.81 
0.60 
1.23 
1  .OO 
1.54 
NA 
NA 
1.67 
0.66' 
0.631 
NA 
0.77 
0.99 
1.03 
NA 
0.88 
0.81 
0.4gk 
1.32' 
1  .OO 
1.52 
NA 
NA 
1.59 
0.50  0.49 
NA  NA 
0.57  0.58 
0.75  0.76 
0.79  0.77 
NA  NA 
0.85  0.85 
0.79  0.79 
0.60  0.4gk 
1.12  1.20' 
1.00  1.00 
1.53  1.48 
NA  NA 
NA  NA 
1.67  1.62 
0.50  0.471 Table 5.7  (continued) 
Note: See the text. The Time-series Generalized Fisher Ideal price index uses the first quarter of each year as a benchmark quarter, then takes the geometric mean of 
quarterly Paasche and  Laspeyres indexes between adjoining benchmark quarters.  Four-quarter sequences of  TGFI indexes are then  linked at  benchmark quarters; 
comparisons between adjoining pairs of benchmark quarters are true Fisher Ideal comparisons. Underlying Paasche and Laspeyres index numbers cannot be calculated 
when some needed price data are missing or unavailable; available data has been used to impute unobserved price changes and chain to adjacent quarters when possible. 
Unless otherwise noted, the Laspeyres (starting-quarter weights) index is chained back to the previous quarter; the Paasche (ending-quarter weights) index is chained 
forward to the following quarter. This procedure imputes a rate of change for missing prices equal to the weighted average of available prices, and has been applied as 
follows: 
Chained to 1988:l using  120 ns, 1M  X  1; 
bChained  using 100 ns, 1M  X  1; 
Chained using 100 and 120 ns, 1M X  I; 
Thained using 100 ns, IM  X  1; 
'Chained  to 1985:3 using 150 ns, 256K  X  1; 
'Chained using  150 ns, 256K  X  1; 
Chained to 1987:3 using 100 ns, 256K  X  1; 
"Chained  using 120 and 150 ns, 256K  X  I; 
'Chained to 1986:l using  150 and  120 ns, 64K  X  1; 
Chained to 1986:l using 150 ns, 64K  X  1; 
kLaspeyres  chained to 1987:2, Paasche to 1988:1, using  120 ns, 64K  X  1; 
'Laspeyres chained to 1987:2, Paasche to 1988:l using 150 ns, 64K  X  1. 
In  1987, the Paasche index cannot be calculated for some quarters in which new products introduced that year were not purchased by  firms in the sample. In this case, 
a subindex for products excluding the newly introduced item was calculated and used (as discussed in the text, this probably creates some positive bias). The following 
two products were excluded in these cases: 
m120  ns, 256K  X  4  excluded; 
'120 ns, 64K  X  4 excluded. 
VWCP = Volume weighted contract price, all chip types; TGFI = approximate Time-series Generalized Fisher Ideal price index; E = European customer basis; U 
= United States customer basis; S = sample basis. 194  Kenneth Flamm 
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Fig. 5.4  256K DRAMs: US.-Europe price indexes and differentials 
exaggerated in the Dataquest figures, and the timing of  1988 increases in  1M 
DRAM contract prices seems to lag the present estimates somewhat. Table 
5.8 displays two variants of annual price indexes based on Dataquest’s esti- 
mated average selling prices for 256K DRAMs with another consulting firm’s 
average-selling-price estimates and a “spot-basis’’ booking price series devel- 
oped in this paper. As can be seen, the billing price estimates from Integrated 
Circuit Engineering (ICE) and my price index generally track each other better 
than either price index based on Dataquest estimates.43 
5.6  Conclusion 
Semiconductor memory  is thought to  have experienced one of  the most 
rapid rates of decline in quality-adjusted price yet measured by economists, 
exceeding even that of  computers.  Examination  of  this question  is compli- 
cated by the extraordinary rate of  introduction of  new products embodying 
technical change and by the complexity of the sales channels and contractual 
43. Note that the (unweighted quarterly  average) Dataquest price for 256K DRAMs used  by 
Dulberger, and reproduced in this table for direct comparison with my price index, behaves very 
differently from Dulberger’s “MOS memory” price index as reproduced in Triplett’s comparison 
table in this volume. 195  Measurement of DRAM Prices: Technology and Market Structure 
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Fig. 5.5  1M DRAMs: U.S.-Europe price indexes and differentials 
Table 5.8  Comparison of Alternative Price Indexes for 256K  DRAMs 
Dataquest  ICE  Flamm TGFI 
Dulberger/Dataquest  (q wtd.  (annual avg.  (avg of 42, 
(simple quarterly avg)  quarterly avg.)  sales price)  43, U.S. weights) 
1985  216 
1986  100 
1987  102 
1988  132 
164 
100 
102 
132 
159 
100 
107 
171 
145 
100 
I14 
156 
Sources: DulbergeriDataquest  form Dulberger  (chap. 3 in  this volume,  table  3.1). Dataquest 
quantity weighted average of quarterly prices calculated by  author using data supplied by Dul- 
berger. ICE calculated by author using data from Integrated Circuit Engineering, STATUS 1992 
(Scottsdale, Ariz., 1992), fig. 6-81,  p. 6-58.  Flamm TGFI is simple average for quarters 2 and 
3, “spot-basis” contract price, U.S. weights, table 5.7. 
arrangements used to market these products. In this paper, results of an econ- 
ometric analysis of a sample of  actual sales contracts for DRAMs have been 
used to produce suitably disaggregated estimates of price change that capture 
most of the effect of technological improvements and deal with the complexity 
of sales arrangements for this crucial product. 196  Kenneth Flamm 
The empirical results for the period  1985-89  suggested that using simple, 
volume-weighted average cost per chip, aggregated across chip speeds and 
organizations, may be a tolerable shortcut in producing an estimate of quality- 
adjusted cost for some given DRAM density, if long-run trends, rather than 
particular quarter-to-quarter changes, are the object of interest. The price se- 
ries constructed here differ in  some important respects from the widely used 
Dataquest estimates,  in the timing of  some significant changes in price and 
the magnitude of regional price differentials. Given the straightforward, well- 
defined description of my sample and procedures, these estimates, or ones like 
them, are probably preferable for economic research purposes. 
A relatively low-cost data collection effort-possibly  including the use of 
advertised prices as well as contract data provided by large consumers-could 
be used to improve price index construction. Timely and frequent updating of 
sampling procedures is clearly crucial in producing any accurate price index 
for a good like DRAMS, where frequent and massive shifts in consumption 
patterns, toward innovative new products, regularly occur. The proliferation 
of  government policies affecting the semiconductor market means that accu- 
rate information that would permit one to track the effects of economic policy 
should now be a high priority on the statistical agenda. 
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Comment  Jack E. Triplett 
This session contains three studies of a single product. Estimating the trend of 
semiconductor prices is of interest in itself, owing to the role of  semiconduc- 
tors as carriers of much of the high-tech electronic revolution of the last thirty 
years. 
The session also provides evidence on a major puzzle of government price 
statistics-the  contradictory and anomalous behavior of the Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Analysis (BEA) computer price index and producer price index (PPI) 
semiconductor price indexes. The PPI for semiconductors declines at a mod- 
est  rate  that  is clearly inconsistent  with  the dramatic decline of  computer 
prices  (see the left-hand columns of  table C.2).  Semiconductors are major 
inputs to the computer industry.  They are also important technological  con- 
tributors  to the  advances  in  computer  capability.  To  paraphrase  Denison 
(1989),  how can computer prices fall so fast if the prices of semiconductor 
inputs to the computer industry do not? Are the computer price  indexes  in 
error, as Denison suggests, or are there problems in the semiconductor price 
indexes? 
Alternatively, we might ask this question another way.  If the PPI semicon- 
ductor price measures are right, an enormous increase in productivity  in the 
computer industry is implied by the computer price indexes that are prepared 
by the BEA; is this plausible? The first section that follows discusses the price 
index issues; the second turns to the productivity questions. 
Jack E. Triplett is chief economist of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of 
Copyright is not claimed for this comment. 
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Table C.2  Comparison of Price Indexes for U.S. Computers and Semiconductors 
(1982 = 100 unless specified) 
Flamm 
(1988:l = 100) 
PriceIndex  3674  3674P  MOS  MOS Memory  and Jang  256P  1M 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
1974  789  110  287  8,251  5,739 
PPI Semiconductors  (DRAM) 
NIPA Computer  Dulberger,  Norsworthy 
1975  704  113  NA  2,601  3,265 
1976  665  107  212  1,592  1,852 
1977  474  101  210  998  1,087 
1978  242  95  187  584  64 1 
1979  205  94  169  496  395 
1980  147  101  NA  353  259 
1981  119  101  NA  NA  I66  163 
1982  100  99  96  101  100  I00 
1983  94  101  96  NA  71  68 
1984  77  107  101  101  55  49 
1985  51  107  95  73  21  32  108  NA 
1986  47  108  94  62  14  23  72  71b 
1987  40  108  92  63  12  NA  90  87b 
1988  38  108  93  75  13  NA  121  102 
1989  36  108  92  . . .  NA  NA  140'  100' 
Sources: Column  1  : Bureau of  Economic Analysis,  unpublished price index for computer processors 
(mainframes). Column  2:  Producer  price  index, Bureau of  Labor  Statistics, LABSTAT  series  PCU 
3674#  (includes secondary products and miscellaneous receipts). Column 3: Producer price index, Bu- 
reau of Labor Statistics, LABSTAT series PCU  3674#P  (primary products only). Column 4: Producer 
price index, MOS memory (taken from Dulberger, chap. 3 in this volume, table 3.7). Column 5: Dul- 
berger (chap. 3 in this volume, table 3.7; Fisher Ideal chain index). Column 6: Norsworthy and Jang 
(chap. 4 in this volume, table 4A.7 [price index for semiconductors used in SIC 3575, computer manu- 
facturing], rebased to 1982 = 100). Column 7: Flamm (chap. 5 in this volume, table 5.7), Time-series 
Generalized Fisher Ideal indexes for U.S. DRAM customers. 
Note:  NA  = not available. 
'Second quarter of the year, unless otherwise specified. 
bThird quarter. 
cFirst quarter. 
Price Index Issues 
Is the Semiconductor PPI Right? 
All three studies present evidence suggesting that the PPI for semiconduc- 
tors  is not right, that  correctly  measured  price indexes for semiconductors 
would fall rapidly, perhaps as fast as computer prices (see table C.2).  Two of 
the three studies (Dulberger; Norsworthy and Jang) present price indexes for 
semiconductors for fairly long time series. Both studies show enormous drops 
in semiconductor prices; these drops contrast sharply with the modest declines 
that are recorded in the PPI. 199  Comment (chaps. 3, 4, and 5) 
Comparing these research price indexes with the PPI for semiconductors 
does present some comparability problems. The PPI index for the semicon- 
ductor industry (SIC 3674, col.  2  in  table C.2) is  an output price index; 
Norsworthy and Jang compute a price index (col. 6) for semiconductors used 
as inputs in other SIC four-digit industries (computers and communications 
equipment). It is well established that the theoretical concepts that underlie an 
output price index differ from those that underlie an input price index: each 
index is based on a different aggregation, for example, and each employs a 
different concept of quality change. Yet conceptual differences between Nors- 
worthy and Jang’s indexes and the PPI cannot account for more than a small 
fraction of the enormous empirical differences between them. 
Dulberger’s comparisons are precisely focused on a single product-MOS 
(metal oxide semiconductor) memory chips. The PPI MOS memory index 
(col. 4) declines more rapidly than the aggregate semiconductor PPI.’ Yet 
Dulberger’s MOS memory price index (col. 5) falls from eight thousand to 
thirteen, a decline that differs so greatly from the relatively modest decline 
shown in the PPI MOS index that the two indexes might be measuring differ- 
ent phenomena. Again, there are potential comparability problems. For ex- 
ample, the Dulberger index includes, but the PPI excludes, production outside 
the United States. However, it is difficult to believe that overseas production 
explains more than a small part of the empirical difference between the two 
indexes. Dulberger’s work indicates, as does Norsworthy and Jang’s, that PPI 
semiconductor indexes have failed to record the full price decline in  semi- 
conductors. 
Dulberger and Norsworthy and Jang tell us  that, during the past  fifteen 
years or so, semiconductor prices have decreased more rapidly than computer 
prices. In  contrast, the PPI indexes indicate that semiconductor prices have 
decreased more slowly than computer prices. Technological information from 
the computer and semiconductor industries as well as anecdotal evidence and 
experiences of computer users all support the picture provided by  the price 
indexes in these papers. The PPI seems in error. 
Flamm’s intensive study of  the relatively short period following the U.S.- 
Japan semiconductor agreement concludes that the agreement reversed-and 
quite suddenly-the  long historical trend detailed in Dulberger and in Nors- 
worthy and Jang (table 4.1, cols. 7, 8).  The PPI also seems to have missed the 
turnaround in semiconductor prices. 
What Are the DiBculties in Pricing Semiconductors for the PPI? 
The authors give a variety of answers. Dulberger notes that controlling only 
for density (bits per chip) produces a biased measure. Other attributes of semi- 
conductors, such as miniaturization, are also important. Flamm notes the cor- 
1. I  presume that the disconcerting gaps in the historical series in col. 4 are  caused by  the 
number of reporters falling below the PPI  disclosure rule-I  believe that the minimum number of 
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relation  of  other attributes  with decreasing  price per bit; miniaturization  in 
semiconductors has its own advantages, quite apart from chip density. Con- 
trolling for all the relevant quality characteristics in semiconductors is difficult 
and leads to specification errors in the price index. Flamm also raises the issue 
of contract price. Does the PPI get true transaction prices? 
However, the overwhelmingly persuasive criticism of the PPI comes from 
Dulberger’s  demonstration  that the point at which new chips are introduced 
into the price index for semiconductors  determines the price decline that is 
recorded in the index.  When new chips are introduced into the index to co- 
incide with their introduction into the market, the price index drops 33 percent 
per year; when the lag in introducing new chips is three years, the price de- 
crease recorded in the index is cut to 20 percent, and a five-year introduction 
lag nearly eliminates the price decrease. In the following, I refer to the bias 
caused  by  delay in  introducing  new chips into the semiconductor  index as 
“new introductions” bias. 
Flamm’s figure 5.2 illustrates new introductions bias in graphic fashion; he 
clearly demonstrates that new chips must be introduced into a price index at 
the point of their introduction  into the market,  not at some later time when 
most of the initial price decline has already occurred. This is particularly im- 
portant in the semiconductor industry because new products quickly account 
for a substantial portion of the market and because they are uniquely the ve- 
hicles for price change in the industry. 
Under present PPI procedures, however, it is difficult to bring new semicon- 
ductor chips into the PPI rapidly enough. The PPI has a sampling procedure 
in which a particular chip, or chips, is selected by probability methods when 
a semiconductor producer is “initiated” into the index. In subsequent months, 
prices are collected for the same chips that were chosen at initiation. A new 
probability selection of  chips will occur only on the PPI’s reinitiation cycle, 
currently  five years  (certain  other circumstances  may  trigger  a resampling 
and, therefore,  reduce the  cycle in  practice). As  noted  above, Dulberger 
shows that a five-year lag in introducing new chips into the PPI virtually  as- 
sures that the index will record only modest price decreases, even when semi- 
conductor prices are in fact falling rapidly. 
New  introductions  bias  poses  a fundamental  challenge  to the entire  PPI 
survey design. The PPI’s elaborate probability  sampling mechanism was put 
into place to ensure that the index was representative of price change and to 
permit  the construction  of  measures  of  sampling error. The change  toward 
scientific sampling surely is to be commended. 
However, we want the PPI to be based on a probability  sample of current 
price changes. The present PPI sampling methodology approximates a prob- 
ability  sample of  sales  in  the  initiation period.2 A  probability  selection of 
2. The PPI  methodology only approximates a probability selection of  sales because the PPI 
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initiation-period sales may be adequate when little change occurs in the range 
of  products that are for sale, when yesterday’s products are pretty much the 
same as today’s. Or the PPI sampling procedure may work fairly well when 
the prices of any new products that are introduced move more or less consist- 
ently with those of established products. Otherwise, however, the elaborate 
and expensive PPI probability sampling methodology does not work and may 
in fact give severely biased measures of price change. 
Empirically, these three papers indicate that the PPI sampling mechanism 
does not work in the PPI semiconductors indexes. The sampling mechanism 
is also problematic for pricing computers, and it is inadequate in the PPI for 
prescription drugs, where new introductions show price movements that differ 
substantially from those for established drugs (Bemdt, Griliches, and Rosett 
1992). Although there is no PPI for CT scanners, the hedonic index that is 
presented in a paper by Trajtenberg (1990) resembles hedonic price indexes 
for computers  far more  than  it resembles the  PPI for medical  equipment, 
which shows only modest declines. 
All these cases are ones of technologically dynamic industries that are char- 
acterized by aggressive product competition. In semiconductors and comput- 
ers, and possibly in the other two as well, the technology gives us new prod- 
ucts at a cost so far below the cost implied by the old technology that the new 
products simply take over the market from the established ones. The prices of 
the established products never fall sufficiently to make them competitive with 
the new products. A price index that records only price movements in estab- 
lished products misses much of the price change that occurs in the industry. 
The new introductions bias can be thought of as a “quality problem” in the 
price index, but it is not a quality adjustment problem. New introductions bias 
has nothing to do with the adequacy of  the methods that are used for quality 
adjustment when new products are encountered in the normal production of 
the index, although inadequate quality adjustment methods can exacerbate the 
problem. It also has nothing directly to do with Laspeyres or Paasche (or even 
superlative index number) weighing schemes, although aspects of  weighing 
problems may be present, may also exacerbate the problem, and may inappro- 
priately influence the sample design process. New introductions bias is a sam- 
pling problem, a case where rapid technological change creates a sample that 
is not representative of current price change in the industry. 
The present PPI sampling methodology forces the BLS to measure techno- 
logically dynamic industries with a sample of old products. Reducing the in- 
terval between reinitiations may produce somewhat better numbers (the mag- 
nitude of the improvement is suggested by Dulberger’s table 3.8); however, 
more frequent initiations will never eliminate the problem and may not reduce 
frame that contains only the establishment’s employment, not its sales. The data on the sales of 
the establishment are  in the Census Bureau’s records, which illustrates one of the deficiencies of 
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new  introductions bias to an acceptable level. What is needed is a complete 
rethinking of  the PPI sampling methodology and possibly as well some re- 
thinking of the purposes of the PPI and the objectives of the PPI ~rogram.~ 
Traditional PPI Methods and Hedonic Methods 
Hedonic methods provide an alternative to traditional PPI methods. It is 
quite well established that hedonic methods can be used to develop price (and 
output) indexes for technologically dynamic industries, and, despite some 
problems, they are better than conventional methods for measuring technolog- 
ically dynamic products. For a review of hedonic methods from the practical 
vantage of a statistical agency environment, see Triplett (1990). For a review 
of their application to a particular high-tech industry, see Triplett (1989). 
Hedonic methods can be used to construct price and output indexes for the 
computer industry, and for some other technological industries, because data 
are available annually on all the product varieties that the industry produces; 
hedonic indexes thus incorporate all the new products in the period in which 
they are introduced into the market. New introductions bias is, accordingly, 
absent. Hedonic methods can also be used to analyze the effects of the various 
ways of introducing new products into the index (see Dulberger 1989; Berndt 
et al. 1992). 
However, hedonic price indexes are often quality-adjusted list price indexes 
because the most readily available cross-sectional price information usually 
consists of published list prices. Some transaction price errors are inevitable 
in hedonic indexes when discounts from list prices ~hange.~ 
As noted above, the PPI sampling methodology can, in principle, get the 
transactions prices right, but using this methodology incurs a substantial new 
introductions bias. Hedonic price indexes using list prices eliminate the new 
introductions bias but may result in a transactions price error. 
The obvious solution is to use a combination of both approaches. If the PPI 
sampling methodology were reoriented to  collect the  average discount by 
class of  product, then these discounts could be employed to correct the he- 
3. For example, in  a monthly  index that serves as contract escalator, it may be  difficult to 
introduce new information that may be available only annually, or with a lag, into the measure. If 
the purpose of the index is analytic, gathering information on new products and the date when 
they were introduced leads naturally to revising the index when additional information becomes 
available. The present PPI is designed as if  its objectives were solely of the first type; analytic 
objectives always, or usually, give way when conflict arises. 
4. However, the error introduced by missing discounts must be small relative to new introduc- 
tions bias and quality-change errors in the long-term trend, at least for high-tech goods such as 
computers. When rebased to 1982 =  100, the computer processor index in Triplett (1989) begins 
at over 76,000 in  1953, falls to 856 in  1972, and winds up at 77 in  1984-i.e.,  the quality- 
adjusted (list) price index indicates that computer prices in 1984 were one-tenrh of 1 percent of 
their level thirty years before. No conceivable change in discounts will perceptibly affect one's 
views of the price change in computers over this period. Changes in list prices and transactions 
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donic indexes for movements in the ratio of list prices to transactions prices. 
The French  statistical  agency is proposing to use this combined method  to 
estimate computer prices (INSEE 1991). A similar reorientation of the tradi- 
tional PPI approach to price index numbers might also be fruitful in the United 
States. 
Productivity and Technical Change Questions 
What Have We Learned about the Allocation of  Productivity Change? 
The introduction to this comment asked whether the enormous productivity 
increase recorded in the computer industry was overstated. These three papers 
suggest that it is. The new price indexes for semiconductors that are produced 
by  these three studies will reallocate  some of the measured multifactor pro- 
ductivity change from the computer industry to the semiconductor ind~stry.~ 
The faster semiconductor prices decline, the greater will be the growth in the 
deflated (quantity) measure of semiconductor inputs used in the production of 
computers, and thus the slower the growth in computer industry multifactor 
productivity.  Some of  the computer industry’s reduced productivity  will  be 
transferred, in turn, to the semiconductor industry because its deflated output 
measure will grow more rapidly when the new price indexes for semiconduc- 
tors replace the PPI. These new price indexes for semiconductors  will more 
accurately allocate the total productivity contribution of these two technolog- 
ically dynamic industries. 
There is a corollary question that is often discussed. Why is the productiv- 
ity increase (price decrease) for computers so much greater than the productiv- 
ity increase (price decrease) for other semiconductor-using  industries, partic- 
ularly communications equipment? 
Dulberger emphasizes differences in the technology  of  the processes  that 
are used by each industry.  Innovations are observed in the characteristics  of 
semiconductors (e.g., density) and also in their manufacturing processes. A 
second stage of technical innovation concerns the packaging of  semiconduc- 
tors on computer cards and boards (her table 3.4 shows the relative contribu- 
tions of chips and packaging to the reduction in delay time). She also empha- 
sizes  the  great  differences  between  logic  chips  and  memory  chips.  The 
computer and communications equipment industries  use different semicon- 
ductors, or use these chips in differing proportions, and will, therefore, bene- 
fit differentially. 
5.  Provided that multifactor productivity studies employ ourpur in the numerator of the produc- 
tivity ratio (the left-hand side of the production, or cost, function), rather than computing “value- 
added” productivity. Output, not value-added, is the appropriate variable for production analysis. 
To  paraphrase a remark that Evsey Domar made thirty years ago, one wants a measure of the 
productivity of the computer industry, not the productivity of making computers without semicon- 
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Norsworthy and Jang also conclude that the use of different semiconductors 
accounts for the differences in the productivity increases of these two using 
industries. They estimate cost functions for the two using industries and find 
that the quality-adjusted  semiconductor prices paid by the two industries dif- 
fer. They give as an explanation that computers and communications equip- 
ment in fact use different semiconductors. 
Flamm  has addressed  this issue elsewhere  (Flamm  1989). He rejects the 
analogy that says that computers and communications equipment both simply 
move information from one place to another. In fact, the technology that each 
one uses is different, and the computer industry has been able to take advan- 
tage of technological changes in electronics more quickly than the communi- 
cations equipment industry. This, of course, might change in the future. 
Aggregation Issues in Studying Quality Change 
The semiconductors  that are used in computers differ from those used  in 
communications  equipment,  as  Dulberger  and  Norsworthy  and  Jang  con- 
clude, and it is plausible  that these  different  semiconductors have different 
price movements. Those facts, however, transparently constitute an argument 
against aggregating the output of the semiconductor industry, as Norsworthy 
and Jang have done. Norsworthy and Jang form an aggregate semiconductor 
industry output measure (SIC 3674). They then employ this aggregate semi- 
conductor industry output measure as an input in the computer industry and 
in the communications equipment industry. 
If computers and communications equipment use different semiconductors 
that have different price movements, or if they use them in differing propor- 
tions,  one should  disaggregate semiconductors  into components.  Then the 
semiconductors that are actually used in, say, communications equipment can 
be  employed in  the using-industry  cost function for that industry; working 
with an output price index for the SIC 3679 industry-wide aggregation intro- 
duces misspecification.  I suspect that the authors might agree and that, in a 
“second round,” they might pursue a more disaggregate approach. 
A similar point can be made about their treatment of  semiconductor char- 
acteristics.  Norsworthy and Jang’s equation (18) suggests that the two semi- 
conductor characteristics (density for DRAM chips and band width for micro- 
processor chips) should be combined with weights that are obtained from the 
using industry’s cost function  in order to get an aggregate measure (a)  that 
they call “quality change.” 
To understand this “quality change” measure, suppose that communications 
(z)  and computers (c) each  use only one type of  semiconductor  (S, and S,, 
respectively).  Assuming  that only these two types of semiconductors exist, 
the  volume  of  the  output of  the  semiconductor  industry  is  the  quantity 
PJ, + PS,)  where Pz  and Pc  designate the prices for the two semiconductors. 
Norsworthy and Jang seek a “quality-adjusted’’ price (P*)  so that the output 
of  the semiconductor  industry  (PJz + PJ,)  can be used as an input to the 205  Comment (chaps. 3, 4, and 5) 
communications industry or the computer industry. The quality-adjusted price 
P* for communications semiconductors is thus defined by 
(1) 
In words, the quality-adjusted price P* is the “deflator” that reduces the value 
of the semiconductor  industry’s output to make it an appropriate measure of 
the  communication  equipment industry’s  input.  Since in  this  example  the 
communications industry uses only S,,  this “deflator” must eliminate entirely 
the part of the semiconductor industry’s output that is not used in communi- 
cations equipment (i.e., PJJ. A similar statement applies to computer indus- 
try semiconductor inputs. 
In addition, as Norsworthy and Jang assume, and as Dulberger and Flamm 
show, if the prices of the two types of semiconductors (P,  and P,) are mismea- 
sured, the computation of the price P* must also correct for any measurement 
errors in  the  output  of  the  semiconductor  industry.  Norsworthy  and  Jang’s 
estimating  procedure,  however,  is as much  an  adjustment for the differing 
compositions of  industry output and of using-industry input as it is as an ad- 
justment for what we usually term quality change. 
This point  indirectly  brings  up an  important, but  often  neglected,  point 
about the PPI. The revised PPI is based on the idea of output price indexes- 
it produces measures that are aggregated for the output of SIC four-digit in- 
dustries, such as the semiconductor  industry.  Yet  many of the uses of price 
indexes require  input aggregations-for  example, semiconductors as inputs 
to computers, or inputs to communications equipment, and so forth. As equa- 
tion  (1) and  the  previous  discussion  suggests, the price  index for industry 
output may be inappropriate for input uses of price indexes. The PPIs for SIC 
four-digit industries may not meet the requirements of analytic data users who 
need alternative aggregations. 
Worse, data users cannot form their own aggregations of product-code PPI 
indexes because the detailed indexes are not always available or because there 
are gaps in them  (see table  C.21,  because  aggregations other than the  SIC 
four-digit  PPIs  are  not  produced  (lower-level  semiconductor  aggregations 
might ameliorate some of the discontinuity problem shown in table C.2), and 
because the PPI product codes often do not match the detailed Census Bureau 
seven-digit product codes with which the detailed PPIs would be used. Users 
must,  therefore,  use econometric  procedures  (such as those of Norsworthy 
and Jang) that would not be necessary if the PPI program were more oriented 
than it is now to the needs of analytic data users. 
Estimating cost functions for high-tech industries is a valuable approach for 
determining the relative contributions to productivity of various stages of pro- 
duction. I am convinced, however, that extension of  the direct, tool-making 
approach of Dulberger and of Flamm has more potential for price index esti- 
mation than econometric models to correct the inadequate presentation of data 
from government statistical agencies. 
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Conclusion 
These are three valuable papers. Dulberger,  Flamm, and Norsworthy and 
Jang have presented results that add to an emerging body of research on tech- 
nological change and on  price change in high-tech industries.  Most of  this 
research shows very large price reductions for technologically dynamic indus- 
tries. Like some of the other studies, these three suggest that there are substan- 
tial deficiencies in the methodology that has traditionally been used in the PPI, 
certainly when it is employed on technologically dynamic products. At some 
point, it will be necessary to reconsider PPI methodology and to search for 
other methodologies that better match the economics, the technology, and the 
marketing practices of technologically dynamic industries. 
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